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I. INTRODUCTION
At one time, a person's solemn oath was taken very seriously
by the English legal system. Indeed, for many centuries, the sys-
tem relied upon oaths as unassailable proof of veracity. An Eng-
lishman haled into court for allegedly owing a debt had the op-
tion of trial by "wager of law."1 If this defendant swore that he
did not owe the money and could find eleven people to testify to
his credibility, then the defendant would automatically win. No-
body cross-examined the vow-takers, for the tribunals assumed
that very few people would lie under oath.2 After all, one's im-
mortal soul stood at risk.
But, as professional oath-takers increasingly constellated at
the courthouse doors, wager of law became a subject ripe for ridi-
cule. In Slade's Case,3 the famous lawsuit culminating in 1602,
Edward Coke helped to convince the royal judges to curtail wager
in their courts when he asserted that, "experience now proves
that men's consciences grow so large that the respect of their pri-
vate advantage rather induces men to peijury." At around the
same date, the government also began gradually to reduce its re-
liance on oaths of allegiance.5
Yet suspicion about the efficacy of oaths began long before
'See JOHN H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 64-65,
265, 268 (2d ed. 1979) (discussing wager of law in debt and covenant); see also S.F.C.
MILSOM, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON LAW 314-60 (2d ed. 1981) (dis-
cussing wager of law). Procedure in places other than the royal common law courts
differed. But, after the mid-sixteenth century, "practical justice in all but minor mat-
ters became coterminous with the law of Westminster Hall" (i.e., the central common
law courts). BAKER, supra, at 272. Where pertinent, this Article discusses other ju-
risdictions.
2 See BAKER, supra note 1, at 64-65.
3 Slade v. Morley, 4 Co. Rep. 91 (1597-1602), reprinted in J.H. BAKER & S.F.C.
MILSOM, SOURCES OF ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 419-20 (1986). This Article touches
upon only one of the numerous and complex issues in Slade's Case, a decision which
inaugurated the modem law of contract.
4 BAKER & MILSOM, supra note 3, at 441.
5 See FRANCES A. SHIRLEY, SWEARING & PERJURY IN SHAKESPEARE'S PLAYS 20
(1979) (discussing the importance of oaths in court and government proceedings de-
spite a decrease in reliance on them around 1600).
[Vol. 72:237238
CAN FORMALISM CONVEY JUSTICE?
1602,6 and the procedural reform that effectively installed the
jury system in place of trial by oath-taking actually encouraged a
new tide of pejury.7 On the other hand, the ritual of swearing
apparently sufficed to assure the honesty of many Britons into
the seventeenth century and beyond.' Thus, it is argued, the con-
troversy in Slade's Case demarcates, at most, one of many per-
ceived crises in a continuing battle against lies in the courtroom.
Still, English theater in the decade before and following
Slade's Case dramatizes a suspicion of oaths while exploring al-
ternative possibilities for securing reliable evidence in a world
which may have seemed increasingly devoid of trust and piety.
This Article will consider four major plays-Arden of Faversham,
The Revenger's Tragedy, Every Man in His Humour, and Volpone.
In each, the oath can be juxtaposed against some other form of
legal "speech act"9 serving, in effect, as an oath-substitute. Such
substitutes often consist of solemnly-made written texts, such as
legislation and other official decrees, or privately signed and
sealed documents. Other oath-substitutes include the confession
6 See J. Ralph Lindgren, Seals, Oaths and the Primacy of Ritual, in
CONSCIENCE, CONSENSUS, & CROSSROADS IN LAW 222-25 (Roberta Kevelson ed.,
1995) (discussing the penalties contained in the Code of Hammurabi and the Old
Testament for lying under oath, in addition to the severe penalties for juror peijury
contained in the English royal constitution by the end of the twelfth century); 5 Eliz.
Ch. 9 (Eng.) (codifying the prohibition of peijury in the central secular courts by or-
der of Parliament in 1563).
7 See BAKER, supra note 1, at 65 (discussing defendants' ability to hire profes-
sional peijurers and the court's provision of same); MILSOm, supra note 1, at 418
(discussing the Star Chamber's treatment of peijury in addition to statutory reme-
dies). In Restoration England, oath-taking "flourished" in the courts and elsewhere,
and the practice retained some utility despite widespread knowledge that "oaths
were a snare to the conscientious and an opportunity for the unscrupulous." John
Spurr, Perjury, Profanity and Politics, 8 SEVENTEENTH CENT. 29, 46 (1993). Spurr
concludes that, "tlhere never was ... a golden age when all oaths were revered and
were, in St. Paul's words, an end to all strife.... The power of the oath to compel
truth was - and still is in the English legal system - a necessary myth.. . ." I& at
45.
8 See Charles Spinosa, The Transformation of Intentionality: Debt and Contract
in The Merchant of Venice, 24 ENG. LIT. RENAISSANCE 370, 375-76 (1994) (citing
BAKER, supra note 1, at 65) (discussing how many defendants took wager of law
quite seriously); see also Spurr, supra note 7, at 29 (explaining how many people in
Restoration England "clung to oaths as a guarantee of truth and of performance").
9 For definitions and applications of speech acts, see generally SANDY PETREY,
SPEECH ACTS AND LITERARY THEORY 59-69 (1990) (discussing the importance of
speech acts in literary theory); KEIR ELAM, THE SEMIOTICS OF THEATRE AND DRAMA
156-70 (1980) (defining speech acts in various contexts); JOHN R. SEARLE, SPEECH
ACTS (1969); SPEECH ACT THEORY AND PRAGMATICS (John R. Searle et al. eds.,
1980).
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and the signet ring. Each of these types of legal speech act will
be discussed as it arises in the context of the plays below. While
each of the oath substitutes is distinct, there exists an overarch-
ing similarity among them, namely, each device attempts to pre-
vent perjury and uncertainty through greater formalism than the
mere spoken oath permits.
In practice, any formal method may prove more flexible and
more unpredictable than anticipated. Yet whether or not the in-
herent plasticity of formalism engenders justice is another mat-
ter, and the four plays enact various aspects of the interrelation-
ship: The Revenger's Tragedy and Volpone, for example, arguably
show that flexibility of law leaves room for abuse. In contrast,
Arden of Faversham demonstrates that inflexibility also aids the
unscrupulous, while Every Man in His Humour paints another
nuanced picture of formalism in tension with justice.
This Article hopes to achieve two objectives. First, it tries to
show how literature can offer insights into literary issues. We
will see that oath-substitutes gained ascendance in a climate of
serious debate within the legal profession. Yet these four great
plays demonstrate, in an irreducibly literary environment, some
major premises, critiques, and conclusions of the legal debate.
Indeed, as will be discussed below, the plays arguably anticipate
a famous solution offered years later by the legal profession."
However, the fundamental difficulties remain to this day and
force us to re-investigate the underlying questions-what is jus-
tice? and how is it tied to conventions of language? This Article
asserts that drama may assist us in answering these questions,
as the theatrical perspective actually directs our attention to
speech-act material: on stage, actors can capture the full force of
words through their gestures and intonation, and a written dra-
matic text often sets the stage, as it were, provoking the reader to
construct a performance from the action-oriented words.11
Moreover, while we cannot entirely reconstruct the modes of per-
formance and reception of four-hundred-year old texts, it seems
that Renaissance audiences and playwrights had a particularly
10 See infra part VIII (discussing the Statute of Frauds).
'1 See ELAM, supra note 9, at 166-70 (discussing how acts and gestures, along
with speech, enhance and can alter the meaning of what is said); Bernard J. Hib-
bitts, Coming to Our Senses: Communication and Legal Expression in Performance
Cultures, 41 EMORY L.J. 873, 953-54 (1992) (arguing that evaluating words alone or
gestures alone in performance media is unwise).
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keen appreciation of legal issues.' In fact, some evidence exists
that Thomas Middleton 13 and Ben Jonson 4 became deeply in-
volved with the jurisprudence of their day. 5 By analyzing these
plays within their historical environment, we might learn from
their sagacity.
6
This Article's second objective is to advance our under-
standing of these plays as literary texts. Many critics have pro-
duced brilliant analyses of each, yet quite a few interpretations
are marred by a relatively weak grasp of the plays' legal allu-
sions. Much remains to be explored by scholars trained in law
schools. 7
12 See DANIEL J. KORNSTEIN, KILL ALL THE LAWYERS? 234-35 (1994) ("Elizabe-
than England was a society enthralled by law.... [Llegal allusions [in plays] ...
were a natural reflection of everyday life.").
13 Thomas Middleton, most likely the author of The Revenger's Tragedy, was
among the most prolific of the seventeenth-century dramatists. He was born in Lon-
don in 1580 and died there in 1627. For information on his life and work, see gener-
ally J.R. MULRYNE, THOMAS MIDDLETON (1979); RICHARD HINDRY BARKER, THOMAS
MIDDLETON (1958).
14 Ben Jonson (1572-1637), the author of Every Man in His Humour and Vol-
pone, is known not only for his plays but for his poetry. For extensive coverage of his
life and work, see generally W. DAVID KAY, BEN JONSON: A LITERARY LIFE (1995);
DAVID RIGGS, BEN JONSON: A LIFE (1989); ROSALIND MILES, BEN JONSON: HIS LIFE
AND WORK (1986).
's See generally BERTIL JOHANSSON, LAW AND LAWYERS IN ELIZABETHAN
ENGLAND AS EVIDENCED IN THE PLAYS OF BEN JONSON AND THOMAS MIDDLETON 6
(1967) (proposing that both Jonson's and Middleton's knowledge of the law "is easily
accounted for" by their association with the Inns of Court) (citing J. HOFFMANN, DIE
GERICHTSSZENEN IM ENGLISCHEN DRAMA VON SHAKESPEARE BIS ZUR SCHLIESSUNG
DER THEATRE, 5-6 (1642)). In fact, both Jonson and Middleton were sent to jail for
being too outspoken in matters the authorities did not want discussed. See
JOHANSSON, supra, at 6. Although Jonson was not a member of an Inn, playwrights
"lived, wrote, had their beings, and produced their plays in close proximity to these
centers of legal learning." PAUL CLARKSON & CLYDE WARREN, THE LAW OF
PROPERTY IN SHAKESPEARE AND THE ELIZABETHAN DRAMA 286 (1942); see also R.S.
WHITE, NATURAL LAW IN ENGLISH RENAISSANCE LITERATURE 73 (1996); Luke Wil-
son, Ben Jonson and the Law of Contract, 5 CARDOZO STUD. L. & LIT. 281, 283
(1993) (discussing Jonson's exposure to a good deal of legal discussion during 1610,
the crucial period in the history of contract). For a study of the frequency, complexity
and accuracy of legal allusions in the plays of Jonson, Middleton and many others,
see generally CLARKSON & WARREN, supra, at 6; 0. HOOD PHILIPS, SHAKESPEARE
AND THE LAWYERS 177, 191 (1972).
16 See RICHARD WEISBERG, POETHICS AND OTHER STRATEGIES OF LAW &
LITERATURE 210 (1992) (noting, in discussing equity, oath-taking and other aspects
of Shakespeare's The Merchant of Venice, that "[iun periods such as our own, when
there is no binding culture or prevailing sense of rightness, flexibility is risky. Lit-
erature can bind us and help us to define a personal and communal voice.").
17 See Bruce L. Rockwood, Introduction: On Doing Law and Literature, in LAW
AND LITERATURE PERSPECTIVES 1-38 (Bruce L. Rockwood ed., 1996) (providing back-
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Before turning serially to each of the specific plays, this Arti-
cle briefly analyzes oaths via the apparatus of speech act theory
(Part II) and outlines the merits and failings of legal formalism
(Part III).
II. OATHS AS SPEECH ACTS
A. Introduction to Speech Act Theory
This Article makes use of several key terms, defined here
and illustrated in an example below. A speech act is a statement
which, by its very utterance (oral or written), puts into effect the
contents of the utterance. Thus, a speech act does something,
such as asking, commanding, or promising.18 Performative utter-
ance is a synonym for speech act.I" Felicity conditions are the set
of conditions necessary for the statement to function as a speech
act;2" while perlocutionary consequences are those consequences
which may result from a successful speech act.2' A misfire occurs
when not all of the felicity conditions are present. Finally, a
statement is said to have proleptic force if the statement will pro-
duce some predictable consequences.
A classic example of a speech act is the legally-operative
words exchanged in a wedding ceremony which by their very ut-
terance join the couple in matrimony if all relevant felicity condi-
tions are present. Throughout some centuries of English history,
the couple married themselves with the exchange of the words, "I
take thee to be my lawful wedded wife [or husband] ...." or by
responding "I do" to the familiar inquiry "Do you take.... ." Al-
most all speech act theorists suggest that the wedding officiant's
statement, "I hereby pronounce you husband and wife," consti-
tutes an even better example of a speech act.22 In English Canon
law, however, it makes absolutely no difference to the validity of
ground on the law and literature movement).
,8 See supra note 9.
,9 "A performative utterance that is not an act does not exist." SHOSHANA
FELMAN, THE LITERARY SPEECH ACT: DON JUAN WITH J.L. AUSTIN OR SEDUCTION IN
TWO LANGUAGES 20 (Catherine Porter, trans., Cornell Univ. Press, 1983) (citing
EMILE BENVENISTE, PROBLEMS IN GENERAL LINGUISTICS 236 (M.E. Meek trans.,
Univ. of Miami Press, 1971)).
20 See PETREY, supra note 9, at 12-13 (discussing felicity conditions).
21 See id. at 16-17; Steven Davis, Perlocutions, in SPEECH ACT THEORY AND
PRAGMATICS, 37-54 (John R. Searle et al. eds., 1980).
22 See, e.g., PETREY, supra note 9, at 7.
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the marriage whether or not the priest said these words.'
For an example, then, let us imagine a couple in twelfth cen-
tury England. In front of a priest, each member of a couple re-
cites the "I take thee... "formula. This exchange of words mar-
ries the couple, if and only if relevant felicity conditions obtain.
Such conditions include that one member of the couple is a man
and the other member is a woman, and that the utterances are
not made in the context of a theatrical production.
The perlocutionary consequences of this speech act include
that the children of the couple are deemed "legitimate," and so
forth, although perlocutionary consequences can encompass less
likely or less foreseeable effects, such as the potential deteriora-
tion in the couple's relationships with their unmarried friends. A
misfire would occur if, for example, the statements were uttered
as part of a staged drama-then, the actor-"bridegroom" and the
actor-"bride" would not be married merely by any exchange of
words.
John Searle2' helpfully distinguishes five broad classes of
speech acts: assertives, also known as constatives, which commit
the speaker to the truth of the proposition asserted (e.g., "I swear
that.. ."); directives, which attempt to get the listener to do
something (e.g., "I order you to.. ."); commissives, committing
the speaker to a future course of action (e.g., "I swear to.. ."); ex-
pressives, which comprise conventional acts such as thanking,
greeting, and congratulating; and declarations, those acts which,
if performed felicitously, actually bring about the state of affairs
proposed (e.g., marrying a couple).'
This Article follows the so-called conventionalist strand of
speech act theory in asserting that societal protocol defines the
"See GEORGE ELLIOT HOWARD, 1 A HISTORY OF MATRIMONIAL INSTITUTIONS
307-08 (Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1994) (1904); cf. THEODORE MACKIN, THE MARRIAGE
SACRAMENT 606 (1989) (explaining that in the Catholic Church, it is the spouses who
minister the marital sacraments, not the Church).
24 John Searle has been a Professor of Philosophy at the University of California
at Berkeley since 1959. Prior to that time, he taught at Christ Church, Oxford and
has held visiting positions at various colleges and universities. His works include
SPEECH ACT THEORY AND PRAGMATICS (John R. Searle et al. eds., 1980); JOHN R.
SEARLE, EXPRESSION AND MEANING: STUDIES IN THE THEORY OF SPEECH ACTS
(1979) [hereinafter EXPRESSION]; JOHN R. SEARLE, SPEECH ACTS (1969). See
PETREY, supra note 9, at 59 (discussing the work of John Searle).
25 See EXPRESSION, supra note 24, at 12-20; PETREY, supra note 9, at 60 (ex-
plaining Searle's five classes of speech acts); FELMAN, supra note 19, at 18-19 (dis-
cussing a variation of Searle's five categories).
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felicity conditions of any given speech act.26 To be effective, a
speech act must "count as" a particular kind of communally un-
derstood commitment or undertaking. 7 Hence, in the words of
Sandy Petrey, "[t]o know whether a marriage has been per-
formed,... we must also know the conventions observed by a
community where the words were spoken."28
B. Oaths
In Searle's nomenclature, oaths constitute a commis-
sive/constative hybrid. Myron Gochnauer applies Searle's frame-
work and consequently suggests that the felicity of an oath de-
pends in part upon the subjective intentions of the speaker.
However, when discussing the speech of dramatic characters who
do not issue soul-searching soliloquies, it is important to examine
the speakers' objective manifestations of intent. This position re-
flects the conception of intention most helpful for reading litera-
ture. 0
Since "word is bond" represented the "master figure by which
feudal society defined itself,""' layers of supplemental conventions
coalesced around the core concept of keeping one's solemn pledge.
26 See PETREY, supra note 9, at 82-3 (discussing Petrey's conventionalist stance).
27 See id. at 7-17 (using marriage as a very public example of a speech act that
changes depending on societal expectations, mores and conventions).
2 Id. at 9.
29 See Myron Gochnauer, Oaths, Witnesses and Modern Law, 4 CANADIAN J.L. &
JURISPRUDENCE 67, 89 (1991) (noting that there are two kinds of oaths---"swearing
to" [do something] and "swearing that"-and separately analyzing the felicity condi-
tions pertaining to each). For purposes of this Article, there is no significant differ-
ence between "swearing to tell the truth" and "swearing that" a given proposition is
true.
22 See JACQUELINE M. HENKEL, THE LANGUAGE OF CRITICISM: LINGUISTIC
MODELS AND LITERARY THEORY 156-63 (1996).
In Anglo-American law, subjective intent is examined much less frequently than
objective intent. Some exceptions include: (i) doctrine of mistake in contract law, see
Peter Meijes Tiersma, Comment, The Language of Offer and Acceptance: Speech Acts
and the Question of Intent, 74 CAL. L. REV. 189, 230 (1986); (ii) interpretation of
wills, see Michael Hancher, Dead Letters: Wills and Poems, 60 TEX. L. REV. 507, 510-
17 (1982); and (iii) criminal law, see JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL
LAW 98-125 (1995). Actual subjective intention is occasionally claimed as the basis
for judicial determination of legislative intent, although, in Western countries, that
approach is currently dominant only in Sweden. See Aleksander Peczenik & Gunnar
Bergholz, Statutory Interpretation in Sweden, in INTERPRETING STATUTES: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY 476-77 (D. Neil MacCormick & Robert S. Summers eds., 1991).
31 J. DOUGLAS CANFIELD, WORD AS BOND IN ENGLISH LITERATURE FROM THE
MIDDLE AGES TO THE RESTORATION xii (1989).
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The best playwrights exploit and challenge the old conventions,
and thus force spectators to question the essential (felicity) condi-
tions for, and the perlocutionary consequences of, "correctly"
taking an oath.
For example, one key convention submits that a coerced oath
never binds the speaker in the eyes of God. If a dramatic charac-
ter apparently breaks his vow without retribution, an audience
member who knows the conventions of oath-taking can work
backwards and form the hypothesis that the character did not
undertake the oath voluntarily at the outset. Yet perhaps the
character instead has merely used the (minor amount of) coercion
present at his vow-taking as an excuse to repudiate his promise.32
In that case, the play interrogates the convention that God pun-
ishes the repudiator.
Clearly, however, a character's oath or curse might have
proleptic force that extends beyond the supernatural. First,
natural causes can often explain why individuals attempt or are
compelled by others to keep their promises. For instance, legal
action for breach of contract or perjury may provide the motiva-
tion needed to bind a speaker. In addition to such expected per-
locutionary effects, we might also anticipate rhetorical or struc-
tural consequences for the dramatic action. For example, if three
different characters, as opposed to just one, declare the same
oath verbatim, the likelihood that the oath will succeed often
rises.33
32 See generally SHIRLEY, supra note 5, at 72-79 (noting that numerous techni-
calities serve as rationalizations for Shakespearean characters to break their vows).
3See SHIRLEY, supra note 5, at 24-43 (discussing oaths as structure).
"[Riepeated acts of swearing... also often function on their own as a leitmotif to
emphasise the meaning of the play." Id. at 42-43. For a sophisticated view of the
consequences of dramatic rhetoric, see Luke Wilson, Renaissance Theater and the
Legal Discourse of Intentional Action 223-28 (1992) (Ph.D. dissertation, University
of California (Berkeley)) (University Microfilms International 1992, No. 9330783)
[hereinafter Renaissance Theater]; Luke Wilson, Hamlet: Equity, Intention, Per-
formance, 24 STUD. LITERARY IMAGINATION 91, 98-99 (1991) [hereinafter Hamlet,
Equity]; see also FELMAN, supra note 19, at 50-51, 66 (discussing the rhetorical force
of repeated promises which she dubs the "Don Juan effect"); ANTON P. TCHEKHoV,
LITERARY AND THEATRICAL REMINISCENCES 23 (S. S. Koteliansky ed. & trans.,
Benjamin Blom, Inc. 1965) (discussing how dramatic narrative has its own rules and
expectations--"[ilf in the first chapter you say that a gun hung on the wall, in the
second or third chapter it must without fail be discharged").
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III. FORMALISM & EQUITY
The oath-substitutes considered below are more formal than
oaths because in all contexts they demand relatively rigid felicity
conditions in the hope of attaining mechanically deducible out-
comes in a whole class of cases.' The "seal" may serve to exem-
plify legal formality: affixing a wax impression of one's personal
seal upon certain contracts and titles to real estate used to self-
authenticate those documents.35 In medieval England, once a
person sealed documents, he could not easily dispute their con-
tents or escape the obligations that the sealed writing imposed.
'Now when anyone in court puts in as proof of his debt a charter
made by the other party or some ancestor of his, the other party
either acknowledges the charter or does not. If the debtor does
not acknowledge the charter, he may deny or contradict it in
two ways: either by admitting in court that the seal is his but
denying that the charter was made by, or with the consent of,
himself or his ancestor, or by denying completely both seal and
charter.
In the first case, where he acknowledges the seal publicly in
court, he is strictly bound to warrant the charter and to observe
without question the agreement set out in the charter as it is
contained therein; and he should blame his own poor custody if
he suffers damage because his seal was poorly kept.'3'
Seals played a mandatory role in many solemn transactions;
for example, a person could not transfer land without sealing the
transfer instrument. Consistent with this regime of severe for-
malism, if the seal physically fell off or mice ate it, the instru-
3 See Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509, 534-35 (1988) (describ-
ing "rules" the author perceives constitute speech acts or performative utterances
and their respective purposes). See generally Desmond Manderson, Statuta v. Acts:
Interpretation, Music, and Early English Legislation, 7 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 317,
324 n.18 (1995) (discussing a brand of legal formalism developed by Ernest Weinrib
currently under debate); cf DENNIS PATTERSON, LAW AND TRUTH 28-35 (1996) (criti-
cizing Weinrib's theory).
Lindgren, supra note 6, at 216-17 (discussing the history of sealing to authen-
ticate).
'6 Id. at 218-19 (quoting THE TREATISE ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF THE
REALM OF ENGLAND CALLED GLANVILL, bk.x., ch.12 (G.D.G. Hall ed. 1965)) (dis-
cussing the seal's history in Roman law). This discussion omits the role of equity. See
infra text accompanying notes 50-52; infra note 152.
37 See Eric Mills Holmes, Stature and Status of a Promise under Seal as a Legal
Formality, 29 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 617, 629-30 (1993) (discussing the use of seals in
real estate transactions).
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ment ostensibly ceased to carry legal force. 8
A legal system may favor such formalism for a number of
related reasons. First, the solemn ceremony involved in attaching
a seal "visibly demonstrate[s] the serious nature of certain
promises... providing security, stability, and certainty."39 Peo-
ple attribute importance to ultra-formalized rituals for the same
reasons that apply, to a lesser degree, to public oath-taking: God
is watching, and prevailing convention accepts the ritual as the
way to accomplish a particular goal." Second, sealed writings
and the like provide relatively trustworthy evidence of the exis-
tence and content of a promise, independent of witnesses' biased
recollections.' As one 1541 case opined, oral communication is
"naked breath.'"' Third, because formalities require time (e.g.,
heating and impressing the wax), they help individuals to think
before they act 3 Ideally, people will bother to seal (and hence
potentially enforce) only socially useful transactions." In the
process, the parties might even clarify details not contained in
their informal negotiations. 5 Fourth, formalism promotes pre-
dictable results. An objective test of enforceability and a visible
sign of authenticity help draw a bright line that laymen and law-
yers alike can use to settle disputes quickly, without resorting to
convoluted and resource-consuming questions about the parties'
38 See id. at 630 n.45 (indicating that by the late sixteenth-century an instru-
ment would maintain its legal force even if the seal fell off or was eaten by mice).
39 Id. at 626.
40 See id. (discussing various rituals requiring the use of a seal); Lindgren, supra
note 6, at 226-29 (describing seals and oaths as stereotyped rituals); id. at 217, 219
(discussing the presumed magical properties and sanctity of seals); Holmes, supra
note 37, at 632 n.49 (indicating that both "the law courts... [and] the ecclesiastical
courts enforced promises under seal").
41 See Holmes, supra note 37, at 627 (stating that seals provide evidentiary secu-
rity in the event of controversy).
42 Waberley v. Cockerel, Dyer 51 (1541), reprinted in BAKER & MILSOM, supra
note 3, at 258. During the Renaissance this view competed vigorously with the pho-
nocentric notion that speech remains less apt to contain falsehoods than writing. See
ELIAS L. RIVERS, QUIXOTIC SCRIPTURES: ESSAYS ON THE TEXTUALITY OF HISPANIC
LITERATURE 85-7 (1983) (discussing how, in an oral society, speech acts and perfor-
mative utterances of honor, loyalty and promises took precedence over modern soci-
ety's written bonds and contracts).
43 See Holmes, supra note 37, at 627 (suggesting that formalities "prevent rash
and impulsive actions" because they require deliberation).
4See id. (positing that "formalities deter legal enforcement of importune and
socially undesirable agreements").
41 See id. at 628 (discussing how the reduction of an agreement to writing helps
clarify the details orally discussed).
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intentions and other extraformal matters. Such predictability
leads to economic efficiency and security in personal affairs.46
Yet once someone invokes the legal system to support for-
malism, injustice and inefficiency can follow. As mentioned
above, formalism is affiliated with two opposing kinds of judicial
failure--overzealous inflexibility and hidden flexibility. On the
one hand, judges who always strive to avoid doctrinal loopholes
effectively bolster overreaching and fraud (e.g., the victimization
of gullible people who sign misleading papers). On the other
hand, judges who find or create loopholes foster unpredictable
and arbitrary outcomes. Recent commentators therefore tend to
encourage judges to abandon the pretense that legal decisions
can be totalized or contained by pre-existing, formalized struc-
ture and instead to acknowledge responsibility for advancing jus-
tice. As Derrida states,
A decision can only come into being in a space that exceeds the
calculable program that would destroy all responsibility by
transforming it into a programmable effect of determinate
causes ... Even if a decision seems to take only a second and
not to be preceded by any deliberation, it is structured by this
experience and experiment [expdrience of the undecidable.47
But, a few astute scholars also insist that formalism works
precisely because many non-lawyers and lawyers rely upon the
illusion of determinacy in providing a stable, efficient basis for
commercial and private transactions.48  Hence, encouraging
judges to introspect or to candidly admit the diverse underlying
rationales for their holdings may not only awaken malevolent
judges to new ways of twisting the system, but the strategy may
provoke a self-fulfilling trend toward intolerable uncertainty.49
This discussion touches upon only some of the issues re-
garding the relative advantages and problems with evidentiary
formalism. Clearly, however, no facile solution emerges. Hence,
it should not be surprising that the English legal system became
embroiled in a centuries-long debate about the proper place of
46 See id. at 625 (designating certainty as an attribute of the seal).
47 JAcQUES DERRIDA, LIMITED INC. 116 (1988).
41 See generally Duncan Kennedy, Legal Formality, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 351 (1973);
Schauer, supra note 34.
49 See, e.g., Scott C. Idleman, A Prudential Theory of Judicial Candor, 73 TEX. L.
REV. 1307 (1995) (discussing the discretion of judges in rendering their decisions);
Scott Altman, Beyond Candor, 89 MICH. L. REv. 296 (1990) (discussing the manner
in which judges' individual beliefs affect their decisions).
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"equity." It was not primitive incomprehension which prompted
the central common-law courts to lag behind the local courts and
the Lord Chancellor in recognizing remedies for fraud and du-
ress," but rather the sophisticated pro-formalist stance of the
common law courts. Indeed, both the common law and equity
courts really shared the same problem: how best to balance for-
malist and anti-formalist visions. 1 We should not, then, fault the
plays under consideration in this Article for ignoring the jurisdic-
tion of equity. 2 Besides the fact that the Chancery had limited
power and could not, for instance, reverse legislation or upset a
wager of law tainted by pejury,53 plays that perceptively anato-
mize formalism indirectly comment upon what occurs in formal-
ism's absence.
Furthermore, the plays' concentration on formalism brings
out some important insights about the practice of judging. One
such insight investigates how the law establishes itself upon cer-
tain fictions, especially those which ignore the potential failures
of formalism. The most important fiction probed in the four
plays, which we might label the "fiction of self-authentication,"
maintains that a legal speech act will be given full and immedi-
ate effect. Typically, characters fantasize that once legislators
enact a statute or once a landowner seals and delivers title to
property, the law will be enforced-every word inviolate.
Enormous problems inhere in this perspective. Even under
the best circumstances, agents need to interpret the words. Once
m0 See MILSOM, supra note 1, at 85 ("Fraud was beneath the notice of the king's
judges rather than above their heads."); see also BAKER, supra note 1, at 271 (dis-
cussing the gaps in the remedies of the common law courts).
6' See Hamlet, Equity, supra note 33, at 96 (citing Plowden's reading of Aristotle
in describing a Renaissance debate which sought to conceptualize the theoretical
similarities and disparities between law and equity - did equity fill a deficiency in
law or fulfill law's own program?). This philosophical debate was complicated by ju-
risdictional competition. See, e.g., THEODORE ZIOLKOWSKI, THE MIRROR OF JUSTICE:
LITERARY REFLECTIONS OF LEGAL CRISES 172-74 (1997) (discussing, most recently,
the division between common law and equity as manifest in The Merchant of Ven-
ice).
52 If we overlay the contemporaneous rules of the English legal system, colorable
fraud charges against private action are not pursued in Volpone and Arden of Faver-
sham. Characters might have appealed from official misconduct in The Revenger's
Tragedy, Arden of Faversham, and Every Man in His Humour. See infra parts IV-
VIII (providing more detailed descriptions of these "equitable" concerns).
See BAKER, supra note 1, at 93-94 (suggesting that the conscience of the
Chancellor was "ordered by law... [as the] acts of a supreme legislature could not
be upset by recourse to conscience").
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again Derrida perceives the fundamental danger:
[Olne cannot reach the law, and in order to have a rapport of re-
spect with it, one must not have a rapport with the law, one
must interrupt the relation. One must enter into relation only
with the law's representatives, its examples, its guardians. And
these are interrupters as well as messengers.'
Essentially, no matter how precise the felicity conditions, a
performative utterance can misfire. Moreover, as time elapses
and circumstances change, the interpretive task imposed upon
the law's representatives becomes more burdensome. In fact,
delegation may actuate a crisis of authority and obliterate the
advantages of formalism, especially if the agents deliberately
read the message in a perverse or uncooperative fashion.55 Yet,
the law does not acknowledge the crisis.
IV. THE REVENGER'S TRAGEDY
A. Relevant Plot Summary
The Revenger's Tragedy" was probably written by Thomas
Middleton, although its authorship has also been credited to
Cyril Tourneur.57 The play was first performed around 1607. In
the play, set in Italy, Vindice vows to avenge the assassination of
his betrothed at the hands of the lecherous Duke. Vindice's
brother, Hippolito, adds fresh motivation by reporting that he
has been asked by Lussurioso, the Duke's heir, to get Vindice's
and Hippolito's sister (Castiza) to sleep with Lussurioso. Vindice
JACQUES DERRIDA, Before the Law, in ACTS OF LITERATURE 203-04 (Derek At-
tride ed. & Avital Ronell trans., Routledge, 1992).
Many scholars have voiced specific concerns about time and agency using the
vocabulary of speech act theory. See, e.g., PAUL DE MAN, ALLEGORIES OF READING
273 (1979); FELMAN, supra note 19, at 66-68; ROBERTA KEVELSON, THE LAW AS A
SYSTEM OF SIGNS 109-10 (1988); Heidi M. Hurd, Sovereignty in Silence, 99 YALE L.J.
945 (1990). One should not overstate the general case however, for most illocution-
ary statements succeed at some pragmatic level. See PETREY, supra note 9, at 140-
44.
6 CYRIL TOURNEUR, THE REVENGER'S TRAGEDY (Brian Gibbons ed., 1967). All
further references are cited in the text.
57 There is a debate among scholars as to who is the true author of The Reven-
ger's Tragedy. For many years it was credited to Cyril Tourneur, but more recently it
has been credited to Thomas Middleton. See Michael Neill, Bastardy, Counterfeiting,
and Misogyny in The Revenger's Tragedy, 36 STUD. ENG. LIT. 397 (1996); see also
Allardyce Nicoll, The Revenger's Tragedy and the Virtue of Anonymity, in
SHAKESPEARE AND HIS CONTEMPORARIES 309-16 (E.A.J. Honigman ed., 1962) (dis-
cussing the authorship debate).
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at once sees the possibility of revenge in this situation: he dis-
guises himself as the procurer Piato and gains access to the ducal
household. Disguised, he also tempts the virtue of his sister, who
spurns Lussurioso's suit, although their mother tries to persuade
her to yield.
The sons of the newly-married Duchess (Ambitioso, Super-
vacuo, and Younger Son) are as evil as their stepbrothers (Lussu-
rioso and the bastard, Spurio). Their misdeeds are described be-
low. Vindice and Hippolito succeed in poisoning the Duke.
Later, during the celebrations of his succession to the dukedom,
Lussurioso is murdered by the same pair, who are aided by fellow
conspirators. Ambitioso, Supervacuo, and Spurio also die vio-
lently in the ensuing confusion, after which Vindice and Hippo-
lito, expecting the gratitude of the newly-elevated duke, Antonio,
confess to the old Duke's assassination. But Antonio, fearful of
their future intentions, orders their immediate execution.
B. Discussion
In The Revenger's Tragedy, agents' treachery and misinter-
pretation contaminate several formal speech acts. This dynamic
operates repeatedly, beginning in the first act, when the judges
begin to pronounce a death sentence upon Younger Son, the un-
repentant rapist. One judge commences, "This be the sentence
... Confirmed, this be the doom irrevocable." (I.ii.67, 76). The
Duchess realizes that, under normal circumstances, the judges'
words kill. Thus, she begs the judges not to complete their sen-
tence (a sentence is both a grammatical unit and a penalty meted
out): "Death too soon steals out of a lawyer's lip." (I.ii.69).5 8 But,
at the last moment, the Duke issues his first command of the
play: "Hold, hold my lord .... We will defer the judgement till
next sitting" (I.ii.82, 84). This deferral of judgment, which causes
the judge's speech act to fail, opens up a space for "flattery and
bribes" (I.ii.90) to corrupt subsequent official procedures.
' Vindice later invokes the same conceit: "Why does yon fellow falsify highways
I And put his life between the judge's lips" (m.v.75-76). Significantly, on three other
occasions, characters refer to solemn words as "poison": when Vindice repudiates his
oath to Lussurioso (I.iii.170), when Vindice speaks of "old men.., that are so poi-
soned with the affectation of law words" (IV.ii.58-59), and when Gratiana recants
her own declarations-"I spoke those words, and now they poison me: / What will the
deed do then?" (IV.iv.136-37). For further poison imagery, see Daniel J. Jacobson,
The Language of The Revenger's Tragedy, 38 JACOBEAN DRAMA STUD. 135-39
(1974).
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The problem of the deceitful agent is exemplified in the
memorable scene where Vindice, disguised as Piato, has poisoned
the Duke. The dying Duke calls desperately to Hippolito, then
quickly learns that Hippolito has conspired all along with Piato:
Duke: Oh Hippolito--call treason!
Hippolito: Yes my good lord. Treason, treason, treason!
[Stamping on him.]
Duke: Then I'm betrayed. (III.v.154-56).
Here, the agent dutifully calls treason as commanded, yet by
mockingly taking the performative power of the command to its
extreme, he commits treason by (and while) saying the word. 9
Many characters notice such perversions of command and
long for an incorruptible agent. The Duchess appeals to Heaven,
the "unbrib~d everlasting law" (I.ii.162), and both Hippolito and
Vindice swear upon their swords, their "bribeless officer[s]."
(I.iv.57; cf I.iii.174). In Hippolito's case, at least, one may doubt
the oath's efficacy. When Hippolito tries to "bind [his friends] all
in steel to bind [them] surely," they respond, "[w]e swear it and
will act it." (I.iv.58, 65). This formula concedes that the oath
alone does not guarantee action. As J. Hillis Miller notes, the
unreliable initial promise seems to demand a second performa-
tive-the intention to keep and act upon the promise.6
The oath-taking conspirators do successfully revolt against
the ducal authority, once they "prepare for deeds, [and] let other
times have words." (V.ii.29). The revenge apparently fulfills Vin-
dice's promise to his sword. By conventions of the day, Vindice
might gain release from his unnatural vow to Lussurioso to pros-
titute his own sister (I.iii.160-65), while Vindice's own, arguably
moral, promise of revenge receives supernatural proleptic force.
In this light, the play conceivably reflects a "deeply moral and
deeply traditional"6' viewpoint.
"9 My interpretation perhaps adds further "piquancy" to the placement of the
stage direction as indicated above. Michael Cordner has insisted that the placement
is correct, as opposed to E. A. J. Honigman's proposal to move the stage direction
down by as much as ten lines. See Michael Cordner, Stamping on a Duke: The Re-
venger's Tragedy III.v, 37 NOTES & QUERIES 205, 205-06 (1990). Incidentally, this
vignette also prefigures Gratiana's realization of the self-condemning power of
words, as quoted in the immediately preceding footnote.
60 See J. HILLIS MILLER, THE ETHICS OF READING 37 (1987).
6' Gamini Salgado, Introduction to THREE JACOBEAN TRAGEDIES 10, 27 (Gamini
Salgado ed., Penguin Books 1969).
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This interpretation, however, is not wholly convincing. As
the conspirators accomplish their revenge in Act V, Scene iii,
strange portents (thunder and a comet) signal a divine presence.
But, few critics believe that these portents demonstrate approval
of blood-letting.62 God might be watching, but the principal char-
acters pay Him lip service at best. Indeed, a number of critics
contend that "[c]raft, not morality, distinguishes Vindice from his
enemies." 3 In particular, one study remarks that Vindice's fall
into corruption accelerates when he vows to seduce his sister and
mother: "Through his oath, [Vindicel has thrust himself into the
dilemma of being damned if he does not attempt the seduction or
damned if he makes the vicious trial of his mother's and sister's
virtues.""
Let us now return to oath-substitutes. With one exception,
the official, juristic speech acts in The Revenger's Tragedy all fail
spectacularly in inception or effect. Consider the key scenes in
which Ambitioso and Supervacuo attempt to have their step-
brother Lussurioso executed and their brother Younger Son re-
leased from prison. First, they urge the Duke to forgive Lussu-
rioso, in the expectation that their pleas will promote the
opposite effect. The crafty ruler perceives their stratagem yet
initially plays along:
Duke: You have prevailed
My wrath, like flaming wax hath spent itself,..
Go, let him be released....
Go, let him be released. (II.iii.91-93, 96).
6'2See Viii stage directions at lines 37, 42; cf. IV.ii.192-97 (thunder apparently
responds to Vindice's words). For criticism, see Kellie Harrison Bean, Tourneur's
The Revenger's Tragedy, 47 EXPLICATOR 8, 8-11 (discussing the significance of
thunder in The Revenger's Tragedy).
G3 Richard T. Brucher, Fantasies of Violence: Hamlet and The Revenger's Trag-
edy, 21 STUD. ENG. LIT. 257, 262 (1981). For a more balanced view, see Jonas A.
Barish, The True and False Families of The Revenger's Tragedy, in ENGLISH
RENAISSANCE DRAMA: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF MADELEINE DORAN & MARK ECCLES
142 (Standish Henning et al. eds., 1976).
Arthur L. Kistner & M. K Kistner, Morality and Inevitability in The Reven-
ger's Tragedy, 71 J. ENG. & GERMANIC PHILOLOGY 36, 40 (1972); see also H.ii.37-40,
100.
6 Lussurioso languishes in prison because of the following chain of events: The
Duchess is enamored of the Duke's bastard son, Spurio. Vindice, disguised as Piato
and hoping to divert Lussurioso from visiting Vindice's sister, tells Lussurioso of the
Duchess's affair. Lussurioso, however, surprises not the guilty couple as he expects
but his own father - who assumes that he himself is the object of his son's murder-
ous intentions and packs him off to prison.
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So far, the Duke has issued two commands, the first passive
and the second active. When pressed more explicitly by Ambi-
tioso and Supervacuo, however, the Duke pretends to change his
mind and issues the following statement to them:
Here then receive this signet;
Doom shall pass. Direct it to the judges.
He shall die ere many days;-make haste. (IIiii.100-03).
The plotting brothers have good reason to believe that they
have obtained some measure of control over their stepbrother's
destiny, for they now hold the Duke's signet ring. As in the case
of the Chancery seal matrix, discussed below,6 whoever physi-
cally possessed the signet ring held the same legal authority as
the ring's original owner. Yet, since Supervacuo is a corrupt
agent himself, he understands that if the enormous power of the
ring is again delegated, it can again be subverted:
[I]f the signet come
Unto the judge's hands, why then his doom
Will be deferred till sittings and Court-days,
Juries and further; faiths are bought and sold,
Oaths in these days are but the skin of gold. (III.i.3-7).
That is, the signet conjures no more lasting purchase upon
events than would a spoken oath. Therefore, Supervacuo and
Ambitioso circumvent the judges, deliberately "mistaking" their
father's meaning and directly addressing the wardens:
Ambitioso: Officers, here's the duke's signet, your firm warrant,
Brings the command of present death along with it
Unto our brother the duke's son.... (III.iii.1-3).
At this point, the conspirators have deliberately enhanced
the odds for fatal consequences of the Duke's speech act, for the
sub-agents (i.e., the wardens) have not been bribed. Indeed, the
wardens give many assurances that they will obey the "warrant"
immediately and without reflection. (III.iii.8, 15-16, 27).67 As is
intimated also in Arden of Faversham, a duly executed (signed)
"See infra note 91 (concerning wax seals); see also supra notes 35-38 and ac-
comManying text.
The word "now" is the most frequently used adverb in The Revenger's Tragedy.
See Scott McMillin, Acting and Violence: The Revenger's Tragedy and its Departures
from Hamlet, 24 STUD. ENG. LIT. 275, 282-83 (1984). As a result, the play has been
compared to Hamlet for its obsession with immediate action. See id Fantasies of
immediate performative power abound (for example, Ambitioso's "Excellent!-Then
am I heir--duke in a minute") (1I.i.12-13).
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death warrant usually effectively "executes" its victim, for its
wording typically is relatively unambiguous and directed at rela-
tively cooperative interpreters.
The Revenger's Tragedy, however, ingeniously explores the
extraordinary case of the failed death warrant."' It first demon-
strates the typical case-a speech act that actually succeeds from
beginning to end. As soon as the brothers leave his presence, the
Duke objectively manifests his true intentions to some noblemen
who genuinely sue for Lussurioso's deliverance: "Rise my lords,
your knees sign his release: / We freely pardon him." (II.iii.122-
23). Unbeknownst to the two plotting brothers, the nobles then
remove Lussurioso from prison. (III.ii). Notice, here, how the
pardon operates. First, the Duke forms a signifying intention at
a particular moment (he signals that he desires the prisoner re-
leased). Second, he formalizes his intention via a stylized com-
mand and a signature. 9 That is, the Duke deems the suitors' act
of kneeling to function as an authorized (if non-customary0 ) sig-
nature. We never learn exactly how the prisoner obtains freedom
on the basis of the Duke's words and the "signature." They yield
the magical power of an idealized speech act.
In contrast, conditions are amiss from the start of the scene
between the Duke and the two conspiring brothers. While the
Duke guesses the brothers' concealed intentions, they do not
guess his. He wants Lussurioso pardoned; however, his spoken
6s The importance of this situation is underscored by similar explorations in sev-
eral other plays of this period. Rosencrantz & Guildenstern's letter is sealed with
Hamlet's father's signet. See WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET V.ii. 13-15, 49-50.
More interesting theoretically are the "mispunctuated" death (CHRISTOPHER
MARLOWE, EDWARD II V.iv.4); the empty box which Pedringano believes contains the
king's pardon (THOMAs KYD, THE SPANISH TRAGEDY II.iv-vi); and the potential
loopholes in Marlowe's Doctor Faustus's (worse than deadly) formal written pact
with the devil. Keir Elam suggests that speech act analysis can account for the cen-
tral events of Marlowe's Doctor Faustus. See ELAM1, supra note 9, at 168-69. For a
new interpretation of the play's contract from the perspective of a law professor, see
Daniel Yeager, Marlowe's Faustus: Contract as Metaphor?, 2 U. CHI. L. SCH.
ROUNDTABLE 599 (1995).
69 Anglo-American law considers objectively-manifest intentions as paramount
for interpreting signatures. See Michael Hancher, The Law of Signatures, in LAW
AND AESTHETICS 227, 230-32 (Roberta Kevelson ed., 1992). The law for interpreting
the validity of a seal has shifted in recent times and now also privileges intent. See
Holmes, supra note 37, at 634.
70 See Charles Spinosa, 'The name and all th' addition King Lear's Opening
Scene and the Common-Law Use, 23 SHAKESPEARE STUD. 159 (1995) (discussing the
authorization of non-customary legal speech acts).
1998]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
words imply that he wants Lussurioso to die soon. Exactly how
soon remains ambiguous-"ere many days" (II.iii.103)-although
the audience knows that the Duke believes that he will obtain
Lussurioso's release in a matter of minutes. Even more improvi-
dently, the Duke gives away his signet ring, the "powerful token"
(III.iv.41) which functions as an unconditional signature. Conse-
quently, the Duke's intentions wither away. The ring cannot be-
gin to ventriloquize them, and he now falls prey to his interpret-
ers. Notice, then, how the two scenes of pardoning juxtapose a
"serious" and a "non-serious" performative, thus illustrating the
parasitic relationship between the two kinds of speech act.71
We have left Supervacuo and Ambitioso at the prison gates,
where they contemptuously call the wardens "[fline fools in of-
fice" (III.iii.27) for harkening so briskly to the spurious death
warrant. Meanwhile, the conspiring brothers have sent a letter
to Younger Son, the imprisoned brother whom they have vowed
to free. 2 The letter reads: "Brother, be of good cheer... Thou
shalt not be long a prisoner... We have thought upon a device to
get thee out by a trick." (III.iv.8, 10, 12).
But, the audience already suspects an irony. We know that
Lussurioso has already left his cell, and soon we will survey the
full extent to which the conspiring brothers themselves stand as
"foolish officers" at the mercy of their own cooperative sub-
agents' misreadings. It turns out that the wardens interpret
Ambitioso's command-to execute "our brother, the Duke's son"
(III.iii.3)-to refer to Younger Son. When Younger Son demands
verification directly from his older brothers, the guards repeat-
edly assure him that the signet ring, along with their memory of
his brothers' words, suffices to authorize Younger Son's death.
(III.iv.43, 50, 55). Next, a prison guard (mis)interprets the letter.
For instance, "Thou shalt not be long a prisoner" (III.iv.62) is
deemed true because Younger Son is about to die. Younger Son
is, of course, horrified by this analysis, and he proclaims, "A vil-
lainous Duns73 upon the letter: knavish exposition!" (III.iv.62).
71 "Non-serious" in deconstructive parlance means "stated without regard to
whether the statement conforms to real intention." J. M. Balkin, Deconstructive
Practice and Legal Theory, 96 YALE L.J. 743, 750 n.18 (1987); see also id. at 750.
72We can infer the brothers' promise from Younger Son's line: "I looked for my
delivery before this; / Had they been worth their oaths." (III.iv.5-6).
73THE PLAYS OF CYRIL TOURNEUR 53 (George Parfitt ed., 1978). The term
"Duns" refers to Duns Scotus, "whose name became synonymous with the most min-
ute and pedantic testual study." Ik
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Younger Son thus learns that "textualism"-whereby the inter-
preter refuses to consider extratextual data-comprises an posi-
tively disastrous hermeneutical technique. The fact that such
literal or "plain meaning" interpretation then enjoyed and still
enjoys widespread usage in legal circles 4 adds a sense of urgency
to the scene.
The fable of misinterpretation culminates in Act HI, Scene
vi, which opens with Ambitioso and Supervacuo arguing about
who should take credit for contriving the plot to dispatch Lussu-
rioso. (The two still believe that the scheme has worked.) Ambi-
tioso claims that, while Supervacuo first articulated the plot,
Ambitioso independently formulated the idea:
Ambitioso: Sir, I say'twas in my head.
Supervacuo: Ay, like your brains then:
Ne'er to come out as long as you lived. (III.vi.12-14).
Next, Ambitioso alludes to his own bright idea:
Ambitioso: This night our younger brother shall out of prison:
I have a trick.
Supervacuo: A trick? Prithee what is't?
Ambitioso: We'll get him out by a wile.
Supervacuo: Prithee what wile?
74 In many situations, the legal community still speaks confidently of "unambi-
guous meaning." See, e.g., STANLEY FISH, THERE'S No SUCH THING AS FREE SPEECH
AND IT'S A GOOD THING Too 141-79 (1994); Clark D. Cunningham et al., Plain Mean-
ing and Hard Cases, 103 YALE L.J. 1561 (1994) (reviewing LAWRENCE M. SOLAN,
THE LANGUAGE OF JUDGES (1993)). In statutory interpretation, textualist doctrine
has suffered a decline only recently, but it still apparently flourishes in England and
in some state courts. See William S. Jordan, HI, Legislative History and Statutory
Interpretation: The Relevance of English Practice, 29 U.S.F. L. REV. 1, 18-20 (1994);
James P. Nehf, Textualism in the Lower Courts: Lessons from Judges Interpreting
Consumer Legislation, 26 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 81-83 (1994). Only a few academics still
defend any form of the "plain meaning" rule, which is, "[iln other words, the lan-
guage being plain, and not leading to absurd or wholly impracticable conse-
quences ... is the sole evidence of the ultimate legislative intent." Caminetti v. U.S.,
242 U.S. 470, 490 (1917); see also Frederick Schauer, The Practice and Problems of
Plain Meaning: A Response to Aleinikoff and Shaw, 45 VAND. L. REV. 715, 717-41
(1992). For citations to recent criticism of the rule, see Nicholas S. Zeppos, Judicial
Candor and Statutory Interpretation, 78 GEO. L.J. 353, 369 n.97 (1989). In contrast,
scholars understandably now recommend contextualist approaches to legislation.
See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAmIC STATUTORY I.NTERPRETATION (1994);
George H. Taylor, Structural Textualism, 75 B.U. L. REV. 321 (1995). For a summary
of four current approaches, see Peter C. Schanck, The Only Game in Town: An In-
troduction to Interpretive Theory, Statutory Construction, and Legislative Histories,
38 U. KAN. L. REV. 815 (1990).
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Ambitioso: No sir you shall not know it till it be done,
For then you'd swear 'twere yours.
[Enter an officer with a bleeding head in his hand.] (III.vi.26-
29).
Ambitioso propounds the absurdity of believing a person's
oath concerning that person's unspoken intentions. This view
aligns, of course, with speech-act theorists who deny the rele-
vance of subjective intent, and it aligns well with the scene just
prior, in which two other conspiring brothers discuss the aspira-
tions for and reality of swearing upon inner thoughts:
Hippolito: Prithee tell me
Why may not I partake with you? You vowed once
To give me share to every tragic thought.
Vindice: By th' Mass I think I did too:
Then I'll divide it to thee. The old duke,
Thinking my outward shape and inward heart
Are cut out of one piece-for he that prates his secrets,
His heart stands o' the outside-hires me by price. (III.v.4-11).
This Article's analysis of legal performatives helps to show
unity within the play in another way, too, for it links heretofore
unexplored portions of the text to the theme of bastardy and
counterfeiting in The Revenger's Tragedy recently charted by Mi-
chael Neill. 5 Neill explains why counterfeiting became a capital
offense in the most serious sense of that phrase:
Impressed upon a coin, the image of a monarch authenticates
and protects the integrity of the coinage while simultaneously
expressing its intrinsic value: the coin is stamped with the
king's authority as the son is stamped with the authenticating
features of his father. Thus offenses such as clipping, guilding,
restamping, and counterfeiting... amounted to iconoclastic
degradation of the royal image and a bastardizing usurpation of
royal authority. The excessive anxiety that attaches to such ac-
tivities in the early modern period, however, reflects the begin-
nings of a major shift from an intrinsic to a representational no-
tion of money value which significantly destabilized what had
been felt as a fixed and essential relationship between the royal
image and the value of the currency on which it was displayed. '
Analogously, speech acts risk destabilizing the law because
75 See Neill, supra note 57, at 401-02.
76 Id.
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they cannot guarantee essential authority after they are deliv-
ered to "representatives" (i.e., agents). J. HIlls Miller must have
pondered this insecurity when he compared performatives, and
particularly promises, to counterfeit coins.77 In theater replete
with references to counterfeiting, the same understanding may
lie in Supervacuo's declaration that courtroom "[o]aths in these
days are but the skin of gold." (III.i.6). This line conveys not only
that jurors accept bribes but also, more subtly, that perjury-a
form of counterfeiting-flouts the monarch's authority.
Additionally, as Younger Son's wardens lead him to execu-
tion, he shouts:
Stay, good authority's bastards: since I must
Through brothers' peijury die, oh let me venom
Their souls with curses. (III.iv.73-74).
Ironically, Younger Son will indeed die as an (unintended)
result of his brothers' perjury.78 Moreover, his brothers' com-
mands achieve the force of law because authority has been bas-
tardized. The signet ring contains the ruler's unique signifier
(i.e., his seal). Once transmitted, the naked uniqueness falls prey
to the perils of re-presentation, to the subversions of the wicked
and the incompetent.79
V. ARDEN OF FAVERSHAM
A. Relevant Plot Summary
Arden of Faversham, penned by an unknown playwright,
was first performed in 1592." In it, Alice plots with her lover,
Mosby, to murder her husband, Thomas Arden. Arden suspects
'7 See MILLER, supra note 60, at 39, 77.78 Peijury was defined broadly in this era and would include a deliberate mis-
communication of the Duke's commands. See SHIRLEY, supra note 5, at 73.
7" By coincidence, Luke Wilson selects a remarkably similar example to eluci-
date the relationship between intention and delegation in law-related Renaissance
drama. In Shakespeare's Richard III, Gloucester and Buckingham enact a charade
to justify a hasty beheading. In the same scene, Buckingham "claims he is so good at
deception that he can counterfeit the counterfeit" (Wilson's gloss for. "I can counter-
feit the deep tragedian."). Renaissance Theater, supra note 33, at 17-21.
80 See generally THE TRAGEDY OF MASTER ARDEN OF FAVERSHAMA (Martin White
ed., 1982). [hereinafter MASTER ARDEN, White]. All further references to the play are
cited in the text. The debate over the play's authorship has produced a list of pro-
posed names ranging from "well-known dramatists such as Greene and Peele to
frankly eccentric suggestions such as Lord Oxford or the 6th Earl of Derby." Id. at
xiv.
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but cannot prove that the two are lovers, yet he often ventures
away on business. Greene, a neighboring landowner, complains
to Alice that Arden has stolen Greene's land and hence his liveli-
hood. In the opening lines of the play, Arden has received title to
real estate formerly owned by the Abbey of Faversham. Alice
convinces Greene to help kill Arden, and Greene hires Shakebag
and Black Will for the task. Michael, Arden's servant, also joins
the conspiracy. Apparently by luck, however, Arden escapes five
different attempts on his life.
Reede, a sailor, begs Arden to return land which Reede
claims Arden has illegally or unethically appropriated. When
Arden refuses to admit wrongdoing or to return the land, Reede
curses Arden. One night soon thereafter, Alice manages to get
Arden to play backgammon with Mosby. During the match, the
murderers take Arden by surprise. Alice's guilty conscience and
some bloody physical evidence lead to the arrest of the malicious
characters, who are ultimately sentenced to death.
B. Discussion
In Arden of Faversham, some characters seem to imbue
oaths with power even as they break and ridicule such oaths.
This ambivalent posture coincided with the larger society's
struggle to keep faith in its solemn pledges in the face of mount-
ing evidence that such faith was naive and dangerous.
In the first act, Mosby has sworn not to sleep with Alice until
Arden dies. Alice mocks Mosby, pointing out that she herself has
broken her marriage vow and maintaining that:
Oaths are words, and words is wind,
And wind is mutable. Then I conclude
'Tis childishness to stand upon an oath. (1.436-38).
Mosby responds, "Well proved, Mistress Alice; yet, by your
leave, / I'll keep mine unbroken whilst he lives," and Alice then
assents, "[a]y, do." (1.439-41). It is possible that this exchange
signifies only that the two agree that their temporary sexual ab-
stinence will goad them on to commit their murderous task. On
the other hand, Mosby hints here that he will keep his vow, not-
withstanding any "logical" arguments (such as Alice's syllogism),
because a vow has special status (beyond its mere "Words" and
beyond mere enlightened self-interest in dealings with other peo-
ple).
Greene also apparently attaches special status to oaths,
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somewhat laughably directing religious language toward the hit
man, Black Will: "Remember how devoutly thou hast sworn / To
kill the villain; think upon thine oath." (III.80-81).s' Similarly,
Reede fervently pronounces a lengthy curse upon Arden in God's
name. (XIII.30-38, 42-53).
This play leaves open the prospect that the above vows and
curses have proleptic strength. After all, these vows and curses
all condemn Arden, who does eventually "succumb." Indeed, a
couple of scholars have insisted that the arrival of Reede's curse
immediately prior to Arden's death indicates that the author
wanted the audience to perceive the curse's effectiveness as God's
accumulated judgment against the rapacious Arden. 2 Michael
Marsden has suggested that we should take the magical power of
oath-taking seriously in this play because the text contains sev-
eral other folk motifs of the supernatural." Additionally, the
tremendous rhetorical power of oaths somehow infects Arden's
controlling logic and alters the characters' fates in ways beyond
the merely psychological."
Still, other scenes cast doubt upon the possibility of prolep-
sis: Greene and Mosby, who apparently do not break their vows,
fare no better (for keeping their word) than other characters in
8' Black Will perhaps realizes that Greene takes swearing seriously, for Black
Will then says, "[since] thou hast sworn, we dare discover all" (IH.147). Neverthe-
less, treading on the safe side, Black Will delivers his secret with an explicit threat
(V.60-63).
See THE TRAGEDY OF MASTER ARDEN OF FAVERSHAM Ixix-lxx (M. L. Wine, ed.
1973) [hereinafter MASTER ARDEN, Wine]; see also HENRY HITCH ADAMS, ENGLISH
DOMESTIC OR, HOMILETIC TRAGEDY 104-06 (1943).
"See Michael T. Marsden, The Otherworld of Arden of Feversham, S.
FOLKLORE Q. 36, 38 (1972).
"See id. Julie Schutzman, for instance, finds in the play's structure and "con-
trolling logic" a "suspended [moment] between the idea of Arden's murder and its
inevitable-but much deferred-realization," which suspension "allows for an explo-
ration of Alice's freedom that remains roughly contained between these two points."
Julie R. Schutzman, Alice Arden's Freedom and the Suspended Moment of Arden of
Faversham, 36 STuD. ENG. LIT. 289, 290-91 (1996). One important feature of this
suspension dictates that Arden's death "becomes a necessary premise to Alice and
Mosby's love." Id. In one respect, Schutzman's position points toward the self-
interest inscribed in Alice and Mosby's rhetoric of abstinence: by unleashing impres-
sive vows of chastity, the couple paradoxically spurs itself into action. Alice then
adds to this rhetoric of vigilance with another hyperbolic oath: "[F]or I have sworn /
That these mine eyes, offended with his sight, / Shall never close till Arden's be shut
up" (XIV.83-85). Schutzman's essay also implies, however, a form of prolepsis, at
least until the suspended moment passes and each character faces his or her ruin.
See id. at 310-11.
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the play, most of whom make oaths solely as bravado and keep
them, if at all, solely out of self-interest. Such pervasive indiffer-
ence to oaths is displayed, for instance, when Greene makes Alice
swear to uphold their bargain. Although Alice asks for the pen-
alties of perjury if she lies, we do not doubt she would break her
word if expedient:
Greene: Will you keep promise with me?
Alice: Or count me false and perjured whilst I live.
Greene: Then here's my hand .... (1.526-28).
Similarly, Black Will once intones, when dissatisfied with
the agreed-upon remuneration, that "a bargain is a bargain"
(111.68-69), even though the bounty on Arden's head later
changes and even though Black Will expressly claims to uphold
only useful vows (111.82-84). Furthermore, while Michael repeat-
edly tells himself that he has "sworn," "promised," and "vowed" to
participate in the murder, we later learn that he really acts pri-
marily out of fear of Shakebag and Black Will, who in turn have
"sworn" his death if he infringes his own vow. (111.197-99, IV.64-
71).
In this play, we cannot trust any character's word, not
Mosby's word to Alice, nor even Alice's word to herself. (Further,
Alice, in particular, masterfully manipulates people by con-
structing and performing roles, even managing to explain away
the incriminating exposure of her "inner" desires after she calls
out Mosby's name in her sleep.)" The solemnity with which the
characters speak rarely if ever guarantees veracity or lasting
success. Yet in the midst of the apparent truth of Alice's (self-
referential and thus paradoxical) taunt that words are "wind,"
two legal allusions reveal a way in which words can retain
power-namely, through written governmental decrees.
Shakebag makes reference to legislation as a form of su-
preme text: "He's dead as if he had been condemned by an Act of
Parliament if once Black Will and I swear his death." (II.100-01).
An "Act," of course, constitutes a piece of written legislation.
Since Parliament had (at least in 1613) "absolute power in all
cases, [including] trying capital cases," 6 Shakebag correctly es-
See Frances E. Dolan, Horne-Rebels and House-Traitors: Murderous Wives in
Early Modern England, 4 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 27 (1992); see also Schutzman, su-
pra note 84, at 299.
"BAKER, supra note 1, at 180 (quoting Sir Henry Finch).
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teems the tremendous force of an "Act." Arguably, the text ap-
proved in Parliament engenders immediate action more than al-
most any other text can; it comprises a performative utterance
par excellence.87
Shakebag creates a fantasy that his spoken oath will also
virtually enact its own words. But, this play repeatedly illus-
trates that vows do not necessarily perform. God does not strike
the perjurer dead, and Shakebag has to swear Arden's death
more than "once" before he succeeds.
In contrast, by commanding extraordinary power, legislation
animates one of the central concerns of this play. Neither Greene
nor Reede can effectively contest the legality of Arden's title to
the Abbey of Faversham because the characters all remain in the
grip of the governmental edicts that authorize Arden's owner-
ship. Henry VIII had dissolved and plundered England's monas-
teries,"8 and in 1539, twelve years before the play's action takes
place, Parliament promulgated a law designed to place beyond all
doubt both the king's authority to grant the monasteries' land to
private parties and those private grantees' right to the land as
against various legal claims.89 The legislation rehearsed all of
the "magic" words required for secure ownership of the land.
The playwright uses these "magic" words in the initial lines
of the play when Arden receives letters patent from the king
giving Arden the Abbey of Faversham.9 These documents met
87 Searle and de Man discuss legislation as speech act. See EXPRESSION, supra
note 24, at 1-25; DE MAN, supra note 55, at 270-77. In the 1980's, several legal schol-
ars extended the analysis. See, e.g., FREDERICK BoWERS, LINGUISTIC ASPECTS OF
LEGISLATIVE EXPRESSION 1-48 (1989); DENNIS KURZON, IT IS HEREBY PERFORMED:
EXPLORATIONS IN LEGAL SPEECH ACTS (1986); M.B.W. Sinclair, Law and Language:
The Role of Pragmatics in Statutory Interpretation, 46 U. PITT. L. REV. 373 (1985).
"8 See generally ROBERT M. ADAMS, THE LAND AND LITERATURE OF ENGLAND: A
HISTORICAL ACCOUNT 125-28 (1983).
89 See JOYCE YOUINGS, THE DISSOLUTION OF THE MONASTERIES 42-43, 81-89
(1971).
90 The statute boldly pronounced that the king "shall be vested, deemed and ad-
judged by authority of this present parliament, in the very actual and real seisin and
possession... his heirs and successors for ever." 31 Hen. 8 ch. 13 (Eng.). Such lan-
guage reinforced that the Crown would have full power to alienate (give away or
sell) the property. See YOUINGS, supra note 89, at 83-84.
"' The author's use of the following words in the play's initial lines (1.3-7) signify
his recognition of the formalities associated with acquiring ownership of land in that
era: "Freely given": Given unconditionally. Also, perhaps, an attempt to void any
competing claims to the land; "To thee and to thy heirs": A verbatim legal formula
that granted the land to Arden (he could then sell it if he so chose, with the king's
permission; he need not necessarily preserve it for his "heirs."); "Deeds": In the exact
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all of the necessary formalities for ownership of the land, as the
playwright takes pains to show. This formality is paramount
since the common law courts in Tudor England used formality as
an eminently practical surrogate for validity. Conceivably, one
way in which the play might subtly accentuate the gravity of Ar-
den's letters patent is by using the word "deeds" to describe these
letters. A "deed" means any sealed instrument, especially one
transferring real estate. Yet "deed" also means "act," which hints
that the documents, although not issued in Parliament, have per-
formative power. This "deed"I"act" wordplay was routinely no-
ticed by English courts.92
As in many other Renaissance plays, Arden's view of the law
contains a plausible message: (1) that formalism succeeds in con-
trolling outcomes but (2) that such outcomes can prove immoral.
Before turning to Arden's demonstration of immorality, it pays to
confirm that the play's view about formalism in real estate law
accurately reflects our understanding of the prevailing legal en-
vironment of the 1590's.
In medieval England, nobody paid much attention to the
form of a real estate deed; "Sealed and subscribed": The wax seal remained a crucial
step for defending against various objections to the enforcement of legal documents
in England until quite recently; "With his name and the king's": Another formality,
since the Lord Protector could act in the king's name in many ways without pre-
tending that the king actually participated.
Then, Greene admits that:
[Arden] hath the grant of late,
Confirmed by letters patents from the king,
Of all the lands of the Abbey of Faversham,
Generally intitled, so that all former grants
Are cut off, whereof I myself had one;
But now my interest by that is void. (1.458-63).
This admission repeats the evidence of prima facie validity of Arden's claims.
Responding to Greene, Alice reports that Arden "hath the grant under the
Chancery seal" (1.468). This seal signifies the last official step required for the for-
malization of letters patent. First, the king would approve the transaction via royal
warrant, and then the office of the Lord Chancellor would publish it via letters pat-
ent. See YOUINGS, supra note 89, at 125. Indeed, the Chancery silver seal matrix
(used to emboss the seal onto documents) represented one of the most powerful for-
malities in history. Whoever was appointed to keep the seal matrix necessarily pos-
sessed the authority that the seal conveyed. See BAKER, supra note 1, at 85. Thus, a
"lord keeper of the great seal" legally had the same authority as a lord chancellor.
Id.; c[. The Revenger's Tragedy, supra notes 56-79 and accompanying text.
"The deed likewise was an act done (factum), in that the specialty was sealed
and delivered before witnesses as an 'act and deed.'" BAKER, supra note 1, at 268.
"Deed" is the Germanic equivalent of the Latin actum (cf modem German Tat). See
KURZON, supra note 87, at 6.
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precise wording of legislation, for parliamentary acts were avail-
able only in unofficial versions, often corrupted or incomplete."
Sometimes, prominent medieval jurists actually helped to draft
statutes,94 which probably led to relatively restrictive readings of
those statutes. Tudor times, however, heralded a new concept of
legislation and a new reverence for the written text: "Legislative
texts were now drawn with such skill by Crown lawyers... that
the judges were manifestly being discouraged from the creative
exegesis they had bestowed on medieval statutes."95
Judges occasionally continued to deviate from the literal
meaning of the written words,' but we should not overestimate
how often judges resorted to the "equity" or "spirit" of the statute.
The English never widely recognized such expansive statutory
interpretation.9 7 Indeed, it is tempting to conclude, with Mander-
son, that when legislation began to refer to itself as "Acts" rather
than just as "Statutes," a "crucial milestone" had been reached.
The legal profession began to see legislation as actively setting
events in motion by virtue of its mere semantic proclamation.98
Yet we should proceed to stress several related provisos over-
looked by Manderson.
First, Renaissance lawmakers knew that statutes would al-
ways require some interpretation by judges. Whether a statutory
preamble recited Parliament's intentions or simply the enact-
ment's formal validity99 depended to a great extent upon whether
9See BAKER, supra note 1, at 179-80.
94 See id. at 181.
95 Id. at 180.
See id. at 181.
97 On the place of literalism versus dynamic interpretation in Anglo-American
legal history and theory, see supra note 74; see also Shael Herman, The 'Equity of
the Statute' and Ratio Scripa" Legislative Interpretation Among Legislative Agnostics
and True Believers, 69 TUL. L. REV. 535, 558-60 (1994) (explaining how the British
became "legislative agnostic[sl," while the civilian inheritors of the same Aristote-
lian/Roman tradition became "true believers" in the equity of the statute); S.H.
BAILEY & M.J. GUNN, SMITH AND BAILEY ON THE MODERN ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM
265-67 (1991) (stating that the validity of English legislation could not be questioned
in any court). Seventeenth-century dicta to the contrary was "controversial even at
that time [and was] not acted upon." Id.; Raoul Berger, Original Intent: The Rage of
Hans Baade, 71 N.C. L. REV. 1151, 1153-56 (1993) (contesting the timing and extent
of the shift to a purposive approach to statutory interpretation).
Luke Wilson is among those who overestimate the reach of equity of the statute
in actual English practice. See Hamlet, Equity, supra note 33, at 93-97.
" See Manderson, supra note 33, at 351. This transformation took place during
the reign of Edward IV (1461-1470, 1471-1483). See id. at 352.
"See id. at 347-48, 352, 356-57.
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Parliament found it necessary to reign in its judicial audience.
This wrangling obscured evidence that "the law" as a whole
achieved more or less formality: in those eras when judges re-
sponded in accordance with the government's wishes, the gov-
ernment could afford to write short, polite laws, but this did not
mean that Parliament thought itself relatively powerless in such
cases.
Second, at the end of the fifteenth century, the enacting for-
mula changed from "the King ... doth ordain, enact, and estab-
lish""° to the formula still used today: °1 "Be it therefore enacted,
ordained and established by the King our sovereign lord .... o2
Manderson suggests that the altered form clearly conveys that
the monarch began to order agents to satisfy his wishes. °3 But,
one professional linguist concludes that the phrase reads "as
though the point of the Act were to make a petition rather than
to enact law." "°4  Certainly, we should remain cautious when
drawing conclusions based upon textual study with respect to
how the legal system understood its mission.
Third, late sixteenth and early seventeenth century statu-
tory law contained disorganized, overlapping, piecemeal, and
clashing directives. The "ungodly jumble" of real estate law, in
particular, presented great challenges to conservative interpreta-
tion and, hence, presented prime opportunities for lawyers and
judges to open loopholes, instilling insecurity in the booming
market for land.' 5
With these facts in mind, we can still confidently suggest
that formalism preserved a influential place in Arden's world.
The play chooses to emphasize this formal domain by focusing on
the effects of a carefully worded statute, the 1539 monastery law,
and by ignoring equity. Arden next obliquely examines corrupt
legal agents. Here, agents are both formalistic and potentially
'0 Id. at 360 (quoting 22 Edw. 4, ch. 7 (1483) (Eng.)).
101 See id.
1'0 11 Hen. 7, ch. 15 (Eng.).
103 See Manderson, supra note 34, at 361.
1"4 BOWERS, supra note 87, at 28. Unfortunately, Manderson ignores speech act
the10Y See REPORTS FROM THE LOST NOTEBOOKS OF SIR JAMES DYER Ixi-lxii (John
H. Baker ed., 1994); Herman, supra note 97, at 559; Lee Ann Rappold, Hamlet and
the Elizabethan Common Law 24-28 (1992) (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Cali-
fornia (Santa Cruz)) (University Microfilms International 1992, No. 9312442)
(quoting BAKER, supra note 1, at 327).
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biased towards Arden at the expense of his enemies.
Functionaries in the Court of Augmentations... probably
would have heard private disputes concerning monastery land.
That tribunal closely allied itself with the Chancery. 0 7 Nonethe-
less, the Court of Augmentations almost always reached its
judgments guided by the common law, not equity, and "[mlost if
not all of the court's central officers ... were by training common
lawyers." 8 Furthermore, the Chancery, if anything, contributed
to the formal legitimacy of the transfer of monastic property,
since Chancery officers sealed the deeds."° Indeed, although in
reality coerced, most monasteries submitted voluntary "deeds of
surrender" to Chancery, which then rubber-stamped the transac-
tion." The amenability to such schemes by a forum supposedly
answering to conscience alone might have had something to do
with the fact that "no less a person than the Lord Chancellor
himself already had expectations of a share of the proceeds" from
the "very first surrender of monastic lands.""'
Arden also might have expected a share in the immoral pa-
tronage system. The historical figure upon whom the character
is based worked in the Court of Augmentations before he mar-
ried, and his wife was the stepdaughter of that court's chancellor.
Thus, Arden arguably reaped the spoils of an exclusive, corrupt
bureaucracy'2 that maintained its exclusion through formalistic
manipulation.
Yet James Keller contends that Arden might have acquired
his land in a routine, legal, and relatively ethical fashion."'
Keller notes, for example, some limited evidence that the Court
of Augmentations by and large established a reputation for fair-
'06 The Court of Augmentations was established in 1536 and was responsible for
all monastic properties and religious houses then being dissolved. See YOUINGS, su-
pra note 89, at 94-95.
107 See id. at 91.
o8 Id. at 100.
'09 See id. at 73-74.
110 Id.
"' Id. at 30. See id. at 73-74, 81-85 (describing the process involved in the sur-
render of monastic lands).
11 See David Attwell, Property, Status, and the Subject in a Middle-Class Trag-
edy: Arden of Faversham, 21 ENG. LIT. RENAISSANCE 328, 338 (1991).
' See James R. Keller, Arden's Land Acquisitions and the Dissolution of the
Monasteries, 30 ENG. LANGUAGE NOTES 20, 21-22 (1993). Keller concedes that Ar-
den's "actions still reveal his avarice and his indifference to the suffering of others."
Id. at 23. But, unlike most scholars, Keller does not find Arden's activities "wicked."
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ness.114 Even if this were the case, Arden's documents, signed by
the king, would still present a formidable barrier to any legal
claims-strong or frivolous. Moreover, it is possible to dispute
Keller's analysis and thus advance the theory that Arden stole
the abbey land.
Keller writes that Greene's account of Arden's acquisition
"could also suggest that the men simply made competitive offers
for the same land, and such a scenario seems not only possible,
but also likely in the rush to acquire cheap land. Under these
circumstances, Arden would simply have been more successful in
expediting his claim."115 Yet Keller's own source, Youings, ex-
plicitly states that: "Only by accident was more than one individ-
ual seeking to buy any particular property at one time, and there
is no evidence of competitive offers.""6
Now, conceivably, Arden offered to buy the abbey before
Greene did, in which case Arden logically should have a superior
right to buy. But, since no routinized mechanism existed to deal
with (apparently infrequent) near-simultaneous offers, unscru-
pulous favoritism could take root in the administrative proce-
dures wherein Arden presumably expedited his claim. 7
Arguably, too, Keller misinterprets the play's text in an ef-
fort to ground his "competitive offer" hypothesis. Greene com-
plains that "all former grants / Are cut off, whereof I myself had
one. .." (1.461-62), to which Keller responds, "[tihe use of the
phrase 'cut off... suggests that a process has been interrupted,
rather than a contract nullified. 11. Yet "cut off' is a very common
term of art in property law meaning "the premature termination
of the [preceding] estate."1 Hence, it seems plausible that, in
114 See id. at 20-21.
"5 Keller, supra note 113, at 22.
1'r YOUINGS, supra note 89, at 118. Youings also avers that "for those with the
necessary capital there was rarely a shortage of opportunities for purchase, but little
or no opportunity for haggling." Id. at 121. Greene offers to sell Mosby the Abbey
lands. (1.293-95).
117 The play perhaps hints that the Crown inadvertently sold the same land
twice, as sometimes happened. The author is indebted to John Baker for noticing
this point. One can speculate that in such a case, nepotism could still taint any re-
medial measures afforded the purchasers.
"18 Keller, supra note 113, at 22.
19 Belleville Nat'l Bank v. Trauernicht, 445 N.E.2d 958, 961 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983).
Lawyers and judges have used this denotation for centuries. For example, at least
ten different state appellate court decisions in America have invoked the term since
1940. See, e.g., Ford v. Thomas, 633 S.W.2d 58, 59 (Ky. 1982); Fleck v. Fleck, 154
N.W.2d 865, 868 (Iowa 1967); Jones v. Burns, 74 So.2d 866, 868 (Miss. 1954). One
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the context of the play, the phrase harbors this technical conno-
tation.
12
Legalistic metaphors add further depth to the mood of inexo-
rable formalism. When Mosby questions Arden about the Abbey
lands, Arden responds:
As for the lands, Mosby, they are mine
By letters patents from his majesty.
But I must have a mandate for my wife;
They say you seek to rob me of her love. (1.300-03).
Love becomes, for Arden, the rent from possession of Alice,
confirmed by judicial order ("mandate"). Yet, earlier, Alice bril-
liantly fantasizes a method to evade both oral and written speech
acts:
Sweet Mosby is the man that hath my heart;
And [Arden] usurps it, having nought but this,
That I am tied to him by marriage.
Love is a god, and marriage is but words;
And therefore Mosby's title is the best.
Tush! Whether it be or no, he shall be mine
In spite of him, of Hymen, and of rites. (1.98-104).
Alice casts aspersions upon the usual manner of gaining
ownership. "Title" to her heart is "usurp[ed]" by Arden on the
strength of mere "words" (marriage vows and marriage contract),
whereas Mosby retains a superior legal claim based upon the
"god," "Love." (Usurpation connotes the illegal termination of the
estate.) Alice next entirely rejects the jurisdiction of the law.
She commands, "[h]e shall be mine," demanding title to Mosby
just as Mosby can rightfully demand title to her.
But, while anyone can say, "[he shall be mine," such a
statement does not conventionally transfer ownership unless
pronounced by a dictator. So, as the action unfolds, Alice's illu-
sion, like Shakebag's, collapses. Her extreme imprecations and
methods cannot stay the requirement of governmental acquies-
cence in title transfer. 2' In fact, Alice's fantasy prefigures its
form of estate in land, the "fee tail," derives "from taille,' meaning 'cut off.'" Trauer-
nicht, 445 N.E.2d at 962.120 Incidentally, Keller misses another legal term of art. Keller notes that Reede
protests against Arden's wrongfully "detain[ing]" (Xiii.13) a plot of land. Id. at 22.
"Wrongful detainer" denotes an "act... of withholding from a person lawfully enti-
tled the possession of land or goods." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 449 (6th ed. 1990).
121 See Attwell, supra note 112, at 345 (explaining that Alice's efforts to "step
outside of subject-positions conventionally allotted to her" were "self-defeating"); see
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own collapse. Alice claims that "marriage is but words," forget-
ting that a marriage ceremony, the quintessential legal speech
act, carries permanent consequences. In the final line of her
speech, she remembers that marriage is also a god (Hymen)-
with powers to rival the immortal Love. Mosby, too, allows
himself a "fantasy of ownership" in which he is "sole ruler of [his]
own" (VIII.36), "a fantasy that at the same time reveals its very
instability," according to Garrett A. Sullivan, Jr."
Analogously, even in the aftermath of Arden's murder, the
unethical letters patent still control the living. Only Reede re-
mains alive and capable of reaping any benefit, and he probably
will not retrieve his tenancy. True, Alice had maintained that,
once Arden received the Abbey land, "whatsoever leases were be-
fore / Are void for term of Master Arden's life." (1.466-67). She
then declared that "[wihen he is dead.., the lands whereof my
husband is possessed / Shall be intitled as they were before."
(1.523-25). Alice is claiming not that Arden himself acquired only
a life estate in the property, but rather that on his death, the
lease revives, presumably with rent payable to Arden's heirs.
What Alice perhaps is alluding to here (though in a garbled way)
is the effect of the dissolution legislation, and the subsequent
Crown grant, upon a prior lease for years by the abbey.1" Appar-
ently however, Alice is lying and merely is giving Reede false
hope of profit if and when Arden dies.1"
Perhaps, to argue further for the remarkable unity within
this drama, one could even compare the letters patent with Ar-
den's corpse. His body mysteriously bled in Alice's presence and
thus "[sipeaks" unassailable evidence of her guilt (XVI.5-6): "It
also Dolan, supra note 85, at 28 (discussing the transitory nature of Alice's self-
governance). But see Schutzman, supra note 84, at 292 (interpreting Alice's intent to
kill her husband as functioning as a "realm of autonomy made possible by the very
fact of its impermanence").
122 Garrett A. Sullivan, Jr., 'Arden Lay Murdered in that Plot of Ground. Survey-
ing, Land, and Arden of Faversham, 61 ENG. LiTERARY HIST. 231, 245 (1994).
'2 The author wishes to thank John Baker for recognizing these points. Appar-
ently, tenants in Reede's position were routinely evicted by the new owners of mon-
astery land, such as Arden. See Keller, supra note 113, at 22-23; but see YOUINGS,
supra note 89, at 83, 113-14 (discussing the types of tenancies permitted and extin-
guished under the dissolution statutes).
124 Schutzman suggests that Alice's comment remains "a rhetorical manipulation
that seems to be based more upon the exigencies of persuasive argument than the
actual terms of Arden's acquisition." Schutzman, supra note 84, at 291.
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bootless is to swear thou didst it not." (XVI.16).' In addition, the
corpse's imprint uncannily remains on the Abbey land. (Epi-
logue.12-13). So, too, the letters patent speak ex cathedra, si-
lencing any opposing oaths; and they, too, leave their imprint on
the land long after their original contractors have died. Thus,
the legal documents' tenacious power attains the symbolic status
of a supernaturally immortal, physical omnipresence.'
Anglo-American law still conceives some real estate deals as
having everlasting effect. The most basic conveyance of land will
contain phrases such as "to X and his heirs forever" and "these
covenants to run with the land forever." Naturally, the majestic
rhetoric sometimes does not deliver what it promises: lawyers
sometimes contest deeds and successfully topple the intended
perpetuity. 7 Nevertheless, Arden exuberantly highlights the
relative tenacity of a particular kind of real estate ownership,
viz., land bestowed by letters patent under the monastery disso-
lution statutes.
One can partially reconcile other recent academic work with
the view set forth in this Article. David Attwell declares that
Arden "can be said to endorse the replacement of corrupt patron-
age with the principles of proper title and ethical constraint."m
He discusses Shakebag's allusion to legislation in relation to
Parliament's consolidation of power.2 9 This Article points out a
specific form of unethical governmental control in statute-
126 This remark, directed to Mosby after he faces other damning tangible evi-
dence in the same brief scene, could just as easily have been said to Alice to elicit her
own confession.12" For other interpretations of the significance of the corpse, see Marsden, supra
note 83, at 41; MASTER ARDEN, Wine, supra note 82, at lxxiv n.1, lxxx; MASTER
ARDEN, White, supra note 80, at xxx; Sullivan, supra note 122, at 231, 246-48. Fel-
man must be credited with linking the literary speech act with the "speaking body"
in the French title of her THE LITERARY SPEECH ACT-LE SCANDALE DU CORPS
PARLANT. See FELMAN, supra note 19.
127 Particularly at the time of Arden's debut and the decade thereafter, land law
fell into turmoil as new methods of making and breaking perpetuities were devel-
oped. See supra text accompanying note 105; Spinosa, supra note 70, at 158.
Ben Jonson incorporated a reference to this possibility in his The Devil is an Ass
(H.iv.33-37), invoking lines he probably borrowed from The Reienger's Tragedy. See
R.V. Holdsworth, The Revenger's Tragedy, Ben Jonson, and The Devil's Law Case,
31 REV. OF ENG. STUD. 305, 307 (1980).
128 Attwell, supra note 112, at 338.
129 See id. at 338, 332. Yet, in his analysis of Tudor efforts to control aristocratic
violence, Attwell does not discuss the play's reference to the statute that forbids
commoners from wearing swords. See id. at 333; Arden, 1.311 (citing 37 Edw. 3 ch. 9
(Eng.)).
1998]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
making, interpreting, and implementing. But, unfortunately in
this case, the government itself must dictate the principles of
proper title, for "proper envelops both propriety and property":"0
one achieves proper title and thus appropriates land only via
principled propriety--that is, via a rule-based, conventional legal
speech act.
Sullivan also analyzes the status of real estate in this drama
and concludes that the play nostalgically "resists a reductive
rent-based relationship between landlord and tenant."'' "The es-
tate.., is understood in the play not in terms of individual own-
ership of land, but as the management of a set of hierarchized so-
cial relations." 2 Yet Arden also repeatedly refers to the details
of individual ownership and its consequence, "fragmenting land
'into freely alienable parcels'... carv[ing] space into fungible
units and, in doing so, effac[ing] the social."' Sullivan takes "so-
cial" to include those obligations and loyalties that arise uniquely
between two particular people."3 But, again, formal legal speech
acts require only conventional behavior, not social behavior. 5
Unique circumstances are exactly what formal action wants to
elide.
VI. EVERY MAN IN HIS HuMouR
A. Relevant Plot Summary
Ben Jonson wrote the remaining pair of plays discussed
herein. Evey Man in His Humour premiered in 1598 and was
first published in the Folio edition of 1616. In this comedy, the
elder Knowell wishes to have his son, Edward, and his nephew,
Stephen, engaged in serious pursuits. The young gentlemen,
however, prefer to entertain themselves among urban fools. The
cast of fools includes Downright (a plain man), Wellbred (Down-
right's half-brother), Matthew (a bad poet), and Captain Bobadill
(a cowardly braggart, who rooms in the lower-class lodgings of
" Jacques Derrida, Signsponge, in ACTS OF LITERATURE 344, 358 (Richard
Rand trans. & Derek Attridge ed., 1992).
'3' Sullivan, supra note 122, at 243.
132 Id. at 245.
'3 Id. at 242.
134 See id.
'31 See STANLEY FISH, IS THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS? 225 (1980) (proposing the
social/conventional distinction in speech act theory).
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Cob, a water carrier). At different points, Brainworm, Knowell's
devious servant, assumes the disguise of a sergeant and a soldier.
Justice Clement, the local justice of the peace, eventually investi-
gates the fools' unruly behavior and re-establishes tranquillity.
B. Discussion
In Every Man in His Humour,136 oaths become mere markers
of class, 13 7 easily made and easily broken because individuals can
so easily fake class position. Brainworm understands the absurd
futility of oaths when, in disguise, he swears, "as I am a true
counterfeit man of war, and no soldier!" (II.ii.23-24). Bobadill,
who is merely a "sign o' the Soldier," and Stephen, who had at
one time fecklessly loitered in a gentlemen's boot camp, both
swear by their soldierhood. Wellbred asks, "what shall I swear
by?" (1V.iii.33), and it hardly matters. Edward chooses to believe
Wellbred in any event, and an oath would not have helped prove
the latter's case. The elder Knowell, though, proffers a solution to
the vacuity of soldierly oaths, chiding Brainworm, "[nlay, nay, I
like not those affected oaths; / Speak plainly, man; what think'st
thou of my words?" (II.iii. 129-30).
Unfortunately, at this point in the play, the solution fails.
The whole problem, of course, is that people cannot discern "plain
speaking" from lies, nor can they discern sincere oaths from "af-
fected" oaths. In fact, in his next line, Knowell tests Brainworm:
"I'll prove thee, if thy deeds Will carry a proportion to thy words."
(II.iii.133-34). Actions may speak louder than words, but as
these plays dramatize, both actions and words often constitute
deceptive performances.
Two of the dozens of oaths in Every Man merit particular at-
tention. First, an important and perilous moment occurs when
Stephen swears "as I'm a soldier" that Matthew's plagiarized po-
ems are "the best that ever I heard." (IV.i.102). On one level,
someone who still trusts oaths would now have cause to believe
that Matthew's verse is outstanding, for within the stereotype
satirized in this play, persons of higher class simultaneously en-
joy the privilege of making oaths and elevated cultural taste (i.e.,
"6 BEN JONSON, EVERY MAN IN HIs HuMOUR (R. S. Knox ed., 2d ed. Methuen &
Co. 1949).
" Esoteric oaths such as "By the foot of Pharaoh!" allow the lower-caste charac-
ters to assume a gentlemanly faqade. See SHIRLEY, supra note 5, at 50-52 (discussing
such "fashionable swearing").
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can correctly judge a poem's originality). On another level, Ste-
phen's oath compares to swearing to the authenticity of a forged
document. That is, Stephen uses the oral expedient of an oath to
add evidentiary weight to the value of a plagiarized written text
(i.e., Matthew's verse). In sum, Jonson's drama suggests that
non-legal matters should gravitate towards closer scrutiny of
texts rather than unthinking faith in the pompously-spoken
word.
In a second example of a noteworthy oath in this play, Every
Man, like Arden, contains a minor character's fantasy of a per-
formative legal utterance. Here, a bruised Cob, having been at-
tacked by Bobadill, confronts Justice Clement in Act III, Scene
iii:
Cob: I go in danger of my death every hour, by his means; an I
die within a twelve-month and a day, I may swear, by the law of
the land, that he killed me.
Clement: How? how, knave? swear he killed thee? and by the
law? What pretence? what colour hast thou for that?
Cob: Marry... both black, and blue; colour enough, I warant
you. I have it here, to show your worship.
[He shows his bruises.] (III.iii.87-96).
Cob asserts that, if he dies within a year and a day, the law
will convict Bobadill of homicide. Even beyond the absurdity of
Cob's aspirations to testify after his own death, he still only par-
tially comprehends the law regarding evidentiary formality. Cob
has ignored an element of the legal proof of causation: the year-
and-a-day rule.
Due to a variety of reasons, the courts established an admit-
tedly arbitrary time limit: if the victim died after the year-and-a-
day limit, the law could not prosecute the attacker for homi-
cide. 3' But, this doctrine did not mean that the victim's death
138 One reason is that, until recently, doctors could not with any certainty de-
termine whether a particular assault caused a chronic condition resulting in death
years later. See D.E.C. Yale, A Year And A Day In Homicide, 48 CAMBRIDGE L.J.
202, 211 (1989). Both Continental and English courts invoke a "year-and-a-day"
limit in other contexts besides criminal law. In the fourteenth-century poem, Sir
Gawain and the Green Knight, the Green Knight supplies the "twelmonyth and a
day" formula as part of his offer to enter into a legally-binding contract with a mem-
ber of Arthur's court. Robert J. Blanch & Julian N. Wasserman, Medieval Contracts
and Covenants: The Legal Coloring of Sir Gawain and the Green Knight, 68
NEOPHILOLOGUS 598, 600-01 (1984).
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within the time limit mandated a finding that he had been
"killed" by the attacker. To prove such a case, the prosecution
had to further demonstrate that the defendant's attack was suffi-
ciently grievous so as to "hasten the victim's death" and that no
completely unforeseeable supervening event killed off the victim
(e.g., while being transported to a doctor for trivial injuries
caused by the attack-which transportation would not have oc-
curred "but for" the attack-the victim was struck by light-
ning)."3 9 Justice Clement rightly upbraids Cob for assuming the
automatic efficacy of sworn testimony based upon legal formulae
("by his means," "twelvemonth and a day"). Clement instead de-
mands to see physical evidence, namely, Cob's bruised arm. Af-
ter seeing Cob's arm, Clement grants Cob his warrant, but only
after scaring him in order to teach him a lesson.
Moving from oaths to official documents, we discover that
the judicial warrant holds a high place in this play, but only
when it meets legitimizing formalities. The first of these formali-
ties requires that the warrant be signed by a judge. In this in-
stance, Cob's warrant for a surety of the peace is valid because a
clerk, significantly named Roger Formal, writes it and Justice
Clement approves and signs it. Clement's signature vouches that
the warrant is not issued by virtue of a witness's mere oath or in
an otherwise unreliable manner. The second formality requires
that the warrant be properly served upon Captain Bobadill, with
felicity conditions including the declaration, "I hereby arrest you
in the king's name." When all of these preconditions coalesce, the
warrant would attain performative power, and the arrestee
would either have to submit or face official wrath.
But, when procedural irregularities arise, misfires occur, and
Clement must forcefully intervene to reinstate the power of legal
speech acts. In Act IV, Brainworm steals Formal's clothes and
sells a spurious warrant to Matthew and Bobadill. Brainworm
then impersonates a sergeant and tries to arrest Downright. Al-
though Downright later threatens his captor, he originally
obeyed the arrest because Brainworm claimed, "I have a warrant
I must serve upon you." (IV.ix.37-38). In Act V, Clement chides
Downright for failing to demand to see a written warrant. If that
had occurred, Downright could have at least inspected it for
authenticity. Such inspections obviously count as one reason
"9 See Yale, supra note 138, at 208.
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why the law should prefer written texts.
Next, Clement, the justice of the peace, berates Brainworm,
whom he still believes to be a true sergeant, for Brainworm's use
of the word "must." (V.i.118-41). Lawrence Levin, in his study of
Clement, suggests that Clement disliked the use of "must" from a
law officer because "[a] command that is unconditionally binding
and seemingly irreversible is anathema to the law, which must
be forceful but flexible."'40 In fact, however, one could attach an
opposite interpretation, namely, that Clement realizes that the
law works best when certain types of commands always produce
a predictable result. For instance, a process server ideally should
function as an automatic messenger of the written document. He
should, without exception, physically deliver the actual warrant.
As mentioned above, the signed warrant signifies that a higher
official has ratified the arrest in due course. Presentation of the
warrant helps assure the potentially violent arrestee of this
prima facie integrity; thus, presentation helps maintain peace
during legitimate arrests and helps subjects resist corrupt ones.
In this light, Clement tells Brainworm that "must" is a useful
word-it guarantees a healthy inflexibility in the law-and thus
minor legal functionaries should not invoke the word vainly.
Brainworm is punished for not delivering the warrant as he
"must."
Taken together, all of the above analysis of this play refines
and extends Levin's interpretation. According to Levin, a central
theme in the play concerns the proper use of language in law-
related discourse:
[B]y contrasting the socially cohesive and venerable English
language with the humor characters who abuse that speech and
thus cause social disorder, Jonson exposes man for the flawed,
irrational creature he is. The connection between law and lan-
guage, therefore, is readily apparent: when language is abused,
whether through ambiguous speech or intentional deception,
misunderstanding results and social order is threatened ....
Of all the individuals in the play, Clement is the only one
who consistently and effectively opposes the perversion of lan-
guage and punishes those guilty of abusing it. In Clement's first
scene with Cob, the Justice takes Cob to task because he uses
language imprecisely, for ambiguous statements can cause mis-
140 Lawrence L. Levin, Clement Justice in Every Man in His Humor, 12 STUD.
ENG. LIT. 291, 296 n.5 (1972).
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understandings, and officers of the law must be correctly in-
formed in order to deal justly and maintain social harmony.
Again, in the final act, when the major themes are reiterated
and reinforced,... [Brainworm] is severely reprimanded by
Clement for perverting the language of law for personal and il-
legal reasons."
This Article has tried to show more specifically, first, how
Cob and Brainworm use legally-operative language "imprecisely,"
and second, how English law directly counteracted the misuse of
speech by doctrinally attaching decreased significance to juratory
pronouncements in favor of intensified formalities. In fact, Jus-
tice Clement, in his sessions with Matthew and Cob, stages a re-
lationship between language and law in a more concrete manner
than Levin envisions. Clement, by ignoring oaths, more easily de-
tects inauthentic documents (Matthew's stolen poems) and more
easily adjudicates causation (i.e., could the law ever claim that
Bobadill "killed" Cob?). Similarly, Clement demands strict ad-
herence to warrant delivery, thereby helping to secure that the
legal text remains untainted by spoken lies.
One can enlist these examples to fortify Levin's analysis of
formality: Levin emphasizes the "formal, ritualistic ceremony" at
the play's finale (in the Quarto version) as a celebration of social
order.' For Levin, as we have seen, such social order arrives
when individuals administer the law in a "forceful but flexible"
manner (i.e., when Clement reprimands people for using words
imprecisely or inflexibly). Thereby, Clement produces "justice
tempered with mercy." The "flexible" view roughly corresponds
to the critique outlined in Part III of this Article regarding law's
indeterminacy - if "must" represents an illusion, then our legal
system arguably should acknowledge and abandon this illusion.
This perspective, however, neglects the role of legal formal-
ism as a linchpin of forceful justice. For example, it might seem
that one should relax the technical rules for service of process
when the arrestee possesses prior knowledge that a justice of the
peace has authorized his apprehension. Similarly, it might seem
that one should imprecisely interpret the time span counte-
nanced by the "year-and-a-day" rule to allow redress of griev-
ances that just happened to take place a year and two days ago.
141 Id. at 297-98.
12 Id. at 299 n.8, 300.
143 Id. at 300.
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Finally, the supremacy of letters patent and other formal docu-
ments militate against uninfluential and uninformed victims (as
in Revenger's Tragedy and Arden). Still, the arguments advanced
in Part III above suggest why the law might nonetheless wisely
prohibit oral testimony from disputing the contents of formal
documents.
Therefore, it behooves Clement not only to demand that his
subjects swear with precision but, even more importantly, to de-
mand that they invoke the "year-and-a-day" rule and the word
"must" with precision. In this light, the Quarto finale's ceremony
symbolically plays out the triumph of formalism.
As in Arden, though, Jonson's drama emphasizes the power
of official decrees and downplays the phenomena that tend to vi-
tiate such power in reality. Perhaps Clement represents "a law
figure approaching his creator's conception of the ideal."1" Yet, in
reality, justices of the peace at that time usually had no legal
training.'45 Clearly, then, a justice with Clement's eccentricities,
but without his competence and integrity, could wreak terror
with his pen. Alternatively, his written orders could lose their
awesome power amid the misleading speeches of the world's Ste-
phens and Brainworms. "'
'" Id. at 293.
145 See MILSOM, supra note 1, at 414-15.
"' Ben Jonson creates just such a dismaying justice of the peace, Adam Overdo,
in his later play, Bartholomew Fair (first performed in 1614). It is no exaggeration to
say that the action in Bartholomew Fair centers around legally-operative "licenses"
and "warrants." Authority resides in the mere possession of these formal documents,
while the "official" authority figures, particularly Overdo, rely on corrupt, literal-
minded, hierarchy-bound agents.
The current author plans to analyze Bartholomew Fair in a forthcoming ex-
tended version of this Article. Some topics ignored by previous criticism that deserve
.o be explored include: i) the significance of the play's linkage of spoken oaths and
written licenses to "benefit of clergy" (I.iv.5-8; III.v.241-42), wherein the mere act of
memorizing or reading a set Biblical passage literally saved a convict's life, in a sali-
ent example of legal formalism; (ii) the relationship between Justice Overdo's solilo-
quy concerning the general problem of legal causation and his earlier soliloquy about
the subsumed problems of temporality and agency (flI.iii; II.i.29-42; IV.vi.89-90); in
his later speech, Justice Overdo, like Justice Clement, shows physical evidence of a
beating and speaks of incidental / proximate causation; (iii) the potential importance
of Johnson's recital of consideration in the Induction (line 120), in addition to his
whimsical requirements of signing and sealing the same document (lines 135-38);
and (iv) a study of formal agents, from the scriveners and clerks who pen the war-
rants (IV.ii.98-100; V.ii.104-05), to Mistress Overdo and His Majesty's Watch as
Overdo's proxies, and to Busy, a corrupt fiduciary (V.ii.62-64). One can compare such
agents to the audience members, who are asked to supply individual judgments. See
Induction. Citations above are to line numbering in BEN JOHNSON, BARTHOLOMEW
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VII. VOLPONE
A. Relevant Plot Summary
Volpone147 (1605) perhaps represents Ben Jonson's most illus-
trious social satire. The action takes place in Venice. The main
character, Volpone (Italian for "Fox"), and his servant, Mosca,
play a cunning and profitable game with all who profess to be
Volpone's friends. Volpone has no heirs, and since it is rumored
that he owns a large fortune, many people court his favor and
bring him valuable gifts hoping he will die soon and bequeath his
estate to them. For three years, Volpone feigns a variety of dis-
eases. Mosca assures each obsequious donor in turn that he is
Volpone's sole heir. The dupes in this scheme include Corbaccio
(an old gentleman), Corvino (a merchant), and Voltore (a lawyer).
Meanwhile, a sub-plot involves a foolish English knight, Sir Poli-
tic Would-Be, and his wife.
Volpone, struck by the beauty of Corvino's wife, Celia, re-
solves to sleep with her. However, Bonario (Corbaccio's son) res-
cues Celia from the attempted rape. In the first of two courtroom
scenes, Voltore represents Volpone against the accusations of
Bonario and Celia. The advocate falsely accuses Bonario and
Celia of plotting against Corvino. He claims that Bonario's father
had disinherited his son in order to achieve Volpone's fortune. He
also maintains that Bonario, enraged at losing his inheritance,
had dragged the debilitated Volpone out of his sick bed and at-
tacked him. Corvino, Corbaccio, and Lady Politic testify against
the innocent pair, while Mosca whispers to them that they are
helping justice. The trial ends well for the peijurers, while
Bonario and Celia are taken into custody.
Next, Volpone, planning to escape Venice with his fortune,
sends his servants to announce that he is dead and that Mosca is
his only heir. Mosca parades around in the clothes of a patrician
and takes control of Volpone's house and servants. When Mosca
is called before the court, however, Volpone follows in disguise,
suspecting that Mosca plans to keep the wealth for himself.
Master and servant argue, and each tries to extort the lion's
FAIR (Eugene M. Waith ed., Yale Univ. Press 1963).
147 BEN JONSON, VOLPONE, OR THE Fox (Alvin B. Kernan ed., Yale Univ. Press
1962) [hereinafter VOLPONE, Kernan]. All further references to the play are con-
tained in the text.
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share of the plunder for himself. When the judges, known as
avocatori, seem ready to believe Mosca and order Volpone
whipped, Volpone removes his disguise and confesses all. Thus,
the second courtroom scene reveals the truth. The judges se-
verely sentence each conspirator, including the greedy perjurers.
B. Discussion
In Volpone, Jonson deploys a critique of swearing and of oral
commentary on written texts and a new way to prove truth via
speech act. First, this comedy denigrates oath-giving in a world
of misleading rhetoric and sham emotions. Sir Politic's
oath--"[n]ow, by my spurs, the symbol of my knighthood"
(IV.ii.29)--serves the same function as Stephen's martial oaths in
Every Man. When almost anyone can simulate higher status,
oaths are no longer supported by sincere and genuinely high
status customs of "honor."4' That is, we may expect that the
merchant, Corvino, will scorn the term "honor" (III.vii.38-40),
and in an era in which knighthoods were bestowed indiscrimi-
nately and sold,19 we may also expect hollow oaths from people
with titles.
In a deeper vein, even the sacred oath of trial witnesses be-
comes an empty ritual in a scene where, as Peggy Knapp insight-
fully notes, witnesses freely falsify and even "reasonably honest"
judges would not easily divine the truth."0 Thus, the avocatori
pointlessly inquire, "[hlas he had an oath?" (IV.v.101) and, "[is
he sworn?" (IV.v.117). "Multitude and clamor" unavoidably
"overcome" the hidden truth, as Bonario fears, because Bonario
cannot possibly present his "conscience" as such, but only within
the imperfect mode of giving "testimony." (IV.vi.16-19).' 5'
To make matters worse, Volpone, like Revenger's Tragedy,
8 See C. L. BARBER, THE IDEA OF HONOUR IN THE ENGLISH DRAMA, 1591-1700
(1957); see also James Hirsh, Cynicism and the Futility of Art in Volpone, in NEW
PERSPECTIVES ON BEN JONSON 106, 106-109 (James Hirsh ed., 1997) (describing
how the characters in Volpone scorn "honor").
19 King James, soon after his ascension in 1603, created knights indiscrimi-
nate.y for political reasons. See VOLPONE, Kernan supra note 147, note to IV.ii.30.
Peggy Knapp, Ben Jonson and the Publicke Riot: Ben Jonson's Comedies, in
STAGING THE RENAISSANCE: REINTERPRETATIONS OF ELIZABETHAN AND JACOBEAN
DRAMA 164, 168, 169-70 (David S. Kastan & Peter Stallybrass eds., 1991).
" As Levin notes, no Justice Clement figure materializes in Volpone to sort out
ambiguous or unreliable testimony and to divine true facts amid the chaos of lies.
See Levin, supra note 140, at 291, 307. The avocatori seem relatively corrupt, foolish,
and sadistic. See also Hirsh, supra note 148, at 109-14.
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dramatizes that authors cannot permanently embody their inten-
tions in texts. Mosca acts out a fable of misinterpretation,
claiming to have "interpreted" Volpone's nods to mean "Corvino"
when Volpone dictated his will. (I.v.30-36). Were this the case, a
judge reading the final product (Volpone's will, which was sealed,
and is referred to as a "deed") may not notice the fraud.152 Simi-
larly, Voltore, Volpone, and Corvino stage a demonic possession
during the second trial scene (V.xii), which allows Voltore to as-
sert that his writings do not represent his "true" views. Here,
oral/visual testimony of possession and dispossession is wholly
unreliable: the judges cannot tell if this is a "true" possession."'
Nevertheless, the staged testimony completely destroys the value
of Voltore's written notes, which in a previous scene he contended
would-without any external explication--"speak clear truth."
(V.x.34).
Given the proliferation of perjury and the opacity of formal
written texts, some (Celia, Bonario) may choose not to testify,
while others may go further in saying (with Sir Politic) that "cal-
umnies are answered best with silence." (II.ii.20). Yet in this
play, as in present-day courts, confession under oath remains the
most believed kind of communication. Once Volpone confesses,
the judges are convinced - "[n] othing can be more clear. / Or can
"2 Sealing the will: In another scene, Mosca tells Voltore that, "[tihe wax is
warm yet" on Volpone's will. (I. iii. 46). Actually, the law of England did not require
a will to be sealed or signed, but, for prudent evidentiary reasons, both were custom-
ary. See CLARKSON & WARREN, supra note 15, at 250-51. If Mosca had control over
Volpone's seal, then the fraudulently-produced will would have more chance of suc-
cess in probate.
The fraud would prosper even further if Mosca and Corvino had conspired to
have (innocent) witnesses present. As with the seal, testators used witnesses for
convenience of proof, rather than as a legal requirement. See id. at 253. Here, wit-
nesses might be duped by the old man's nods into believing that he truly assented to
Mosca's transcription.
This Article simply argues that the will appeared prima facie valid. Even in the
Elizabethan and early Jacobean periods, judges used "general principles" of fraud to
invalidate wills procured by methods such as those described in Volpone, once such
fraud was proved in court. See id. at 270-71 (discussing the scene). An aggrieved
suitor for Volpone's gold could also have argued that Volpone did not possess the
sound mind necessary to make a will. "[B]y the time of the Elizabethan dramatists,"
such a requirement was "well settled and widely understood." Id. at 232.
15 A seventeenth-century audience would accept the possibility of witchcraft;
and spurious symptoms of possession similar to the ones staged here are described
in sources dating from 1599 to 1603. See BEN JONSON, VOLPONE OR, THE Fox 295
n.24-31 (R.B. Parker ed., Manchester Univ. Press 1983) [hereinafter VOLPONE,
Parker].
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more prove [tihese [Bonario and Celia] innocent." (V.xii.96-97).
Thus, the avocatori refuse to listen to another word. (V.xii.94).
Indeed, a confession constitutes a "miracle" (V.xii.95) - akin to
someone's conscience transfiguring into testimony: Bonario's
seemingly vain hope in Act IV, Scene vi has been realized. As
Paul de Man has noted, "[c]onfessions occur in the name of an
absolute truth which is said to exist 'for itself... and of which
particular truths are only derivative and secondary aspects.""
In his ground-breaking treatment, de Man shows that con-
fessions are a special kind of speech act. One can, in fact, analo-
gize the presumption of a confession's genuineness to the pre-
sumption of the transparency of words in a legal document or of
the exalted status of oaths. Above, we have called such presump-
tions the "fiction of self-authentication." De Man mounts an
analogous attack on the alleged reliability of the "voluntary" con-
fession.'55 Essentially, unconscious guilt often motivates people
to "stage... scene[s] of exposure" and, once accused, their need
to confess escalates "as the only propitiation of accusation, in-
cluding self-accusation for being in a scene of exposure .... The
very act of confessing necessarily produces guilt in order to be
functional."
156
One can read about such false confessions not only in de Man
and Dostoevsky, but also in legal and psychological case studies.
The heightened risk of false self-inculpation emanating from the
relatively coercive atmosphere of official legal proceedings has
been extensively probed since the Supreme Court's decision in
Miranda v. Arizona.5 7 Yet people have worried about this prob-
lem for centuries, and indeed, a Renaissance audience might
have found hints of a critique of confessions in Volpone itself.
The critique arises when the courtroom spectators try to de-
cide what fuels Volpone's confession:
154 DE MAN, supra note 55, at 279 (quoting Rousseau).
.5 See id. at 278-301.
15 Peter Brooks, Storytelling Without Fear? Confession in Law and Literature, in
LAW'S STORIES: NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC IN THE LAW 114, 124 (Peter Brooks &
Paul Gewirtz eds., 1996) (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
157 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (finding statements or confessions made by a person in
custody during an incommunicado interrogation will not be admitted as evidence ab-
sent a showing that the detained was informed of, and voluntarily waived constitu-
tional protection, which it is incumbent upon the government to provide). See gener-
ally Brooks, supra note 156, at 114-34 (providing an illuminating analysis from a
literary perspective of several of the issues raised here).
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Whipped?
And lose all that I have? If I confess,
It cannot be much more. (V.xii.82-83).
This explanation seems insufficient: Why should Volpone
confess if it might cause him any more harm? Why not cut his
losses and slink away?
One approach would focus on Volpone's psychology, as op-
posed to the play's structure. Any number of modern critics co-
gently discover a flaw that brings the villains, by their own
greedy hands, to the point at which the fox is about to throw off
his disguise and confess. The flaw does not become (literally) fa-
tal5 until after Volpone blurts out his admission. Still, one takes
just a small step to argue that Volpone's despondency, confusion,
humiliation, loneliness, or anger at his fall-and his concomitant
envy of Mosca's rise-lead him irrationally to plummet further by
revealing his crimes.
An alternative psychological explanation would posit that
Volpone savors the performative aspect of confession: he gains
the spotlight and artistic closure, and he can even attempt the
"ultimate con," gathering sympathy in the end by telling the
truth.9 Shoshana Felman has written about the pleasures of
speech acts in general;6 Michel Foucault has dwelt upon the
pleasures of confession in particular. 6' One can suppose, then,
that the very performative pleasures that cause Volpone to swear
false oaths leads him addictively to seek further delight in the
same vein. Hence, his confession-the ultimate virtuoso per-
formance. What better way for Volpone "[tio make a snare for
[his] own neck[ I and run / [His] head into it wilfully[,] with
laughter!" (V.xi.1-2).
15 See V.xii.125 ("This is called mortifying of a fox."). The multiple punning may
include up to six different connotations, of which one is "sentencing to death."
VOLPONE, Parker, supra note 153, at 302 n.125. Venice at that time was renowned
for its severe and righteous judicial system. See DAVID MCPHERSON, SHAKESPEARE,
JONSON, AND THE MYTH OF VENICE 37-38 (1990); Richard H. Perkinson, 'Volpone'
and the Reputation of Venetian Justice, 35 MOD. LANG. REV. 11, 12 (1940).
169 The idea of the "ultimate con" is borrowed from Canfield's elucidation of
Chaucer's The Pardoner's Tale. See CANFIELD, supra note 31, at 87. For Volpone's
artistic exhibitionism, see generally John W. Creaser, Introduction to VOLPONE, OR
THE FOX 1, 17-34 (John W. Creaser ed., 1978); Alexander Leggatt, The Suicide of
Volpone, 39 U. TORONTO Q. 19, 29-30 (1969).
'6 See FELMAN, supra note 19, at 28-32, 61-62, 101-12.
161 See 1 MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY 62, 70-71 (Robert
Hurley trans., 1980).
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Crucially, however, the same kinds of complex yet irrational
motivations can cause innocent people to stage dramatic scenes of
exposure. Certainly, it would not occur to most spectators, on the
sole basis of their psychoanalyzing the protagonist, to ponder the
question, "[ilfVolpone were innocent, would he still confess?" Yet
the play points us in that direction with an allusion to the prob-
lematic stance of torture as a means of proof.
On the Continent, from the mid-1200's to the mid-1700's, ap-
plication of torture comprised a "routine and judicially super-
vised" method that strived to "eliminate human discretion from
the determination of guilt and innocence."162
Torture was not supposed to be used to elicit an abject, unsub-
stantiated confession of guilt. Rather, torture was supposed to
be employed in such a way that the accused would disclose the
factual detail of the crime... [that] 'no innocent person [could]
know'.... [Several other safeguards were also established to
protect the defendant.]
Alas, these safeguards never proved adequate to overcome the
basic flaw in the system. Because torture tests the capacity of
the accused to endure pain rather than his veracity, the inno-
cent might... 'confess things that they never did.' If the exam-
ining magistrate engaged in suggestive questioning, even acci-
dentally, his lapse could not always be detected or prevented.
These shortcomings in the law of torture were identified even in
the Middle Ages and were the subject of emphatic complaint in
the Renaissance .... 16
In contrast to the Continentals, the British never systemati-
cally used torture to investigate crime." One historian argues
that this difference derives from the fact that the English jury
never required as high a standard of proof for conviction as the
"certainty" demanded on the Continent.'65 Nevertheless, on rare
occasions, the English authorities did resort to torture as a
1' John H. Langbein, Torture and Plea Bargaining, 46 U. CHI. L. REv. 3, 3-4
(1978).
' Id. at 7-8. See generally JOHN H. LANGBEIN, TORTURE AND THE LAW OF
PROOF: EUROPE AND ENGLAND IN THE ANCIEN REGIME 3-26 (1977) [hereinafter
TORTURE]. Torture was common in Venice. See C.J. Gianakaris, Jonson's Use of
"Avocatori" in Volpone, 12 ENG. LANGUAGE NOTES 8, 14 (1974); McPHERSON, supra
note 158, at 37-38.
16 See TORTURE, supra note 163, at 9, 73.
'6 Id. at 73-74, 77-80, 138; cf Mirian Damaska, The Death of Legal Torture, 87
YALE L.J. 860 (1978) (reviewing TORTURE, supra note 163).
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means of encouraging confessions in ordinary cases of suspected
burglary, counterfeiting, and the like.166 Torture had its heyday
in England during the 1580's and 1590's; after 1602, torture
rapidly receded, and it virtually disappeared from England after
1640.167 So, it stands to reason that, in the chronological period
under discussion in this present Article, Englishmen would have
been aware of the merits and disadvantages of torture." Jonson
himself "possessed a sophisticated grasp" of the Venetian justice
system, including the details of the torture chamber. 169
Viewing an English play set in Italy, a Renaissance audience
might have interpreted Bonario's response to Voltore's sarcasm
in the following courtroom exchange as a serious invitation to
torture:
Voltore: Perhaps [Volpone] doth dissemble!
Bonario: So he does.
Voltore: Would you ha' him tortured?
Bonario: I would have him proved.
Voltore: Best try him then with goads, or burning irons;
Put him to the strappado; I have heard
The rack hath cured the gout, 'faith, give it him,
And help him of a malady; be courteous.
I'll undertake, before these honoured fathers,
He shall have yet as many left diseases
As she has known adulterers, or thou strumpets. (IV.vi.28-37).
After having watched by this point numerous scenes of pro-
tested innocence, the audience may begin to wonder how to sepa-
rate the truly innocent from the counterfeits. The first proffered
method involves torture. This method is plausible, for, remarka-
bly, Italy continued to sanction torture precisely because torture
remained the only available means of certain proof, once society
chose no longer to rely upon the oath and trial by ordeal.7 ° By
the close of Act IV, this play has demonstrated the futility of
oaths and the audience, as yet, has no assurance that the peijur-
'r See TORTURE, supra note 163, at 73-94.
67 See id. at 81-82, 134.
'68 See id. at 73-74, 88-90, 135-39; see also JAMES HEATH, TORTURE AND ENG-
LISH LAW 92, 139-40 (1982).
'9 Gianakaris, supra note 163, at 14.
'7 See generally TORTURE, supra note 163.
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ers will ever be undone. 7' Next, the play offers what seven-
teenth-century spectators would view as a highly controversial
and unappetizing yet plausible alternative to oaths-namely, tor-
ture to achieve evident justice.
This very plausibility might have set Renaissance audience
members to ponder why they should eventually reject that solu-
tion. In the above lines, Voltore insinuates that torture can
make its victims deny the existence of their (actual) gout or prac-
tically anything else.'72 To audience members who can cogni-
tively place torture in the same category as other confession-
inducing environments, Voltore's words also imply that not all
torture-free confessions are truthful either.
Recall further that Volpone seems afraid of physical pain,
and this fear alone might spur him into the immediate confes-
sion:
Whipped?
And lose all that I have? If I confess,
17' Even spectators who stay confident that Jonson will provide a moral conclu-
sion could still share the emotional impact of Volpone's "false ending," as described
by Stephen Greenblatt:
In Volpone, instead of the emotion of multitude we have precisely the
avoidance of depth in a vertiginous swirl of words .... And we, in the audi-
ence, participate in this flow, for we do not want Volpone to stop, any more
than the crowd at a circus wants the tightrope walker to fall, though its
enjoyment is predicated on that possibility.
Volpone's act culminates in the first trial scene. The latter half of act 4 has
the feeling of a finale.... [I]n act 4 of Volpone, imposture unexpectedly tri-
umphs: judgment fails, the innocent are condemned, and the fox is set free.
What is the effect on this "finale"? For a moment, Jonson offers the audi-
ence a resolution precisely the reverse of the one he will finally provide. It
is as if he were testing the spectators, forcing them to reexamine their own
sympathies: "You have identified with Volpone.... All right, I give you
Volpone's triumph." The audience must ask itself, "What would a world be
like in which Volpone has triumphed?" In reply, it wills Volpone's ultimate
downfall.
Stephen Greenblatt, The False Ending in Volpone, 75 J. ENG. & GERMANIC
PHILOLOGY (1976), reprinted in BEN JONSON'S VOLPONE, OR THE FoX 29, 30-31
(Harold Bloom ed., 1988).
72 Note that a popular myth held that the rack did cure the gout. See VOLPONE,
Parker, supra note 153, at 252 n.33. This allusion by Voltore, though, does not sig-
nificantly weaken the above argument. Volpone fabricates many ailments besides
the gout, to which disease Bonario vainly hopes that Volpone will confess. Also, Vol-
tore suggests several tortures besides the rack. (The rack and the manacles (or
"strappado") were the two methods of choice in England.) See TORTURE, supra note
163, at 84-85. Indeed, the allusion ingeniously adds another dimension to Voltore's
sarcasm: the rack will always "cure" the gout, either in reality or via the victim's
desperate confession that he never had the disease.
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It cannot be much more. (V.xii.82-83).
Of course, the court eventually sentences Volpone to a pun-
ishment far worse than whipping, but arguably Volpone had
hoped for leniency.
In addition, Voltore's statement about his client's remaining
diseases indicates that torture does not necessarily unearth
crime, especially if the examinee hires a good lawyer. This point
reappears in the less extreme context of "voluntary" confession
when Voltore successfully retracts his own truthful and self-
incriminating confession. (V.xii).
But, here we find dramatized in Volpone a second critique of
the confession as substitute for the unadorned oath. Since psy-
chological inquiry cannot always distinguish true from faked ad-
missions, and since characters can effortlessly retract true ad-
missions (and engage in a host of other solemn deceptions), we
must look to generic conventions to explain why the court auto-
matically believes Volpone's last-minute confession. Canfield
provides just such a structural rationale for why the villains'
oath-breaking irresistibly dooms them."" He observes how they
mock religious, chivalric, and moral rhetoric throughout, and
thus a sublimely appropriate finale proclaims that some inscru-
table power has re-established the fine traditions of keeping one's
word:
In short, Volpone seems designed to finally wrest control of the
Word from those who would appropriate it, perjure and pervert
it, threaten to empty it of all meaning, and turn it into a mere
instrument of gain or, even worse, of sheer play. The Word...
appears throughout most of the play to have degenerated from
its divine original (the Logos), to have lost its divine sanction.
But in the nick of time it is reappropriated to its sociopolitical
function of binding men and women together by the promise
that their aristocratic code is ultimately efficacious, that it has
real meaning and Real support. 4
Still, ever since Volpone's premibre, audiences must have
recognized this comic convention as such. Theater-goers would
by and large perceive that, in their own lives and in the halls of
justice, swearing does not guarantee divine witness. In fact, un-
til morality arrives in the "nick of time," the play itself reinforces
'73 See CANFIELD, supra note 31, at 101-04.
74 Id. at 104.
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that perception in many ways, as discussed above.175  Finally,
Jonson employs the confession as the mechanism of the deus ex
machina." Consequently, recognition of the convention of pun-
ishing perjury might allow spectators to ponder whether the ab-
solute truth of sworn confessions represents a mere convention
as well.
Renaissance theater features several other memorable con-
fessions. One in particular is so germane to this Article that we
should not overlook it. In The Revenger's Tragedy, Vindice's plot
triumphs completely, until at the last moment he boasts to Anto-
nio of his role as assassin. The horrified Antonio surprises Vin-
dice with a death sentence and the explanation, "[y]ou that would
murder him would murder me!" (V.iii.105). Vindice then utters
these lines:
When murderers shut deeds close this curse does seal 'em:
If none disclose 'em, they themselves reveal 'em!
This murder might have slept in tongueless brass
But for ourselves, and the world died an ass. (V.iii.lll-14).
Here, confession is a curse that seals a deed; that is, in the
legal connotation, a spoken performative functions to authorize a
writing. (A legal deed by definition cannot become effective until
sealed with wax.) Without the spoken component, the document
would remain closed, useless, and in that sense mute or
"tongueless" even though physically permanent as a brass tablet.
Yet the oral speech act with the power to vivify the brass writing
is none other than voluntary confession. Apart from this specu-
lative interpretation of these lines as a juridical parable, how-
ever, Vindice's stunning finale typifies the egomaniacal, compul-
sive pleasures of confession and, as such, contains an implicit
critique of confessions' validity.
176 See also Hirsch, supra note 148, at 116 (discussing virtue and faith in divine
intervention in Volpone).176 The "deux ex machina," a dramatic device used since the fourth-century B.C.,
refers to either the artificial appearance of a god at the end of a drama to resolve the
plot (occasionally through use of a crane), or, more generally, "an improbable event
that brings order out of chaos." 4 THE NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 41 (15th ed.
1986); see also MERRIAM WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 316 (10th ed. 1993).
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VIII.CONCLUSION
In seventeenth century England, dissatisfaction with the
solution in Slade's Case heightened as hired witnesses perjured
themselves as much as those who used to wage law. Sir Matthew
Hale even proposed "to reintroduce wager of law, or to require
some 'signal ceremony' or writing to bind the parties."1 In 1677,
however, the legislature adopted another answer, the Statute of
Frauds. This law sought to prevent perjury by making certain
classes of oral contract completely unenforceable without evi-
dence in writing. Yet due to the complexity of the problems ad-
dressed in this Article, the subsequent history of the statute re-
vealed flaws:
Strict enforcement of its terms could easily have protected more
frauds than it was designed to prevent. Courts of law and equity
therefore took every opportunity to limit its scope by construing
it in such a way as to promote the policy of inhibiting frauds;
but this policy only added to the obscurity of some of the provi-
sions."8
In hindsight, we might claim that the plays studied in this
Article anticipate both the value and the shortcomings of the un-
precedented emphasis on writing demanded in later years by the
Statute of Frauds. In any event, the tragedies and comedies ex-
hibit fascinating and entertaining perspectives on these sophisti-
cated issues.
Ironically, if these present interpretations seem to read too
much into plays that might at first glance appear only tangen-
tially related to the role of formalism in justice, the plays them-
selves seem to comment upon the inevitability of re-
interpretation. For, these playwrights were highly sensitized to
the issues of performance versus text-creation because of the ar-
tistic, legal, and economic implications of publication.179 It makes
'7 BAKER, supra note 1, at 289.
178 Id. at 290 (footnote omitted).
9 See generally RICHARD DUTTON, BEN JONSON: AUTHORITY, CRITICISM 104
(1996); JONATHAN HAYNES, THE SOCIAL RELATIONS OF JONSON'S THEATER 134-35
n.24 (1992); Stephen Orgel, What is a Text?, in STAGING THE RENAISSANCE:
REINTERPRETATIONS OF ELIZABETHAN AND JACOBEAN DRAMA 83-87 (David S. Kas-
tan & Peter Stallybrass eds., 1991); Stephen Orgel, Making Greatness Familiar, in
THE POWER OF FORMS 41-46 (Stephen Greenblatt ed., 1982) (discussing how theater
was legitimized during the Renaissance by the high status that publication confers
on plays); MARK ROSE, AUTHORS & OWNERS: THE INVENTION OF COPYRIGHT 9-30
(1993); John Feather, From Rights in Copies to Copyright: The Recognition of
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sense, then, that they were intrigued by documents, such as
deeds and legislation, that ostensibly served by legal fiat as
"authorized" or "final" versions.
Authors' Rights in English Law and Practice in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Cen-
turies, 10 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 455 (1992).
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